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UNITED STATES V. FULLMER
AND THE ANIMAL ENTERPRISE
TERRORISM ACT:
“TRUE THREATS” TO ADVOCACY
INTRODUCTION
The past three decades witnessed the emergence of animal law and
a diffusion of animal welfare beliefs and practices throughout
society.1 An increasing number of Americans adhere to vegetarianism
and veganism, oppose the use of animals in research, and believe that
animals have the right to an existence free from suffering.2 This
increased acceptance, like most change, is directly attributable to the
efforts of advocates and the robust and uninhibited protection of
speech that the First Amendment affords them, but recent
1
The Animal Legal Defense Fund was founded in 1979. For information regarding the
history of the ALDF, see About Us, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, http://www.aldf.org (last
visited Feb. 26, 2011); see also Fran Ortiz, Animal Law: A New Breed of Practice, HOUSTON
LAWYER, May/June 2008, available at http://www.thehoustonlawyer.com/aa_may08/page
30.htm (stating that, as of 2008, 117 American law schools have student ALDF chapters and
that over 90 offer at least one course in animal law, up from only nine in 2000).
2
See Richard Corliss, Should We All Be Vegetarians?, TIME, Jul. 15, 2002, at 48, 49
(stating that, as of 2002, “[s]ome 10 million Americans . . . consider themselves to be practicing
vegetarians,” and another 20 million have tried it); see also Tom L. Beauchamp et al., Can
There Be Cruelty-Free Cosmetic Testing?, in THE HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN
ETHICAL CHOICE 201, 206 (Tom L. Bueaucham, et al., eds., 2d. ed. 2008) (“Polls have shown
that 85–96% of the public is against animal testing of beauty, vanity, and household products.”)
(citation omitted) [hereinafter Cruelty-Free]; Winston J. Craig, Health Effects of Vegan Diets,
89 AM. J. CLINICAL NUTRITION 1627S, 1627S (2009) (“A nationwide poll in April 2006 by
Harris Interactive reported that 1.4% of the American population is vegan, in that they eat no
meat, fish, dairy, or eggs.”); Colin Jerolmack, Tracing the Profile of Animal Rights Supporters:
A Preliminary Investigation, 11 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 245, 246 (2003) (“In a 1995 poll conducted
by the Associated Press, two-thirds of respondents agreed with the statement, ‘an animal’s right
to live free of suffering should be just as important as a person’s right to live free from
suffering.’”); Heidi Benson, No To Meat, But Yes To Skin: Vegan Vixens Use Cheesecake To
Promote Cause, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 18, 2007, at F1 (“A 2003 Harris Interactive poll found that
2.8 percent of the U.S. adult population is vegetarian, representing a nearly .5 percent increase
in three years when compared with 2000 U.S. Census statistics.”).

1
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developments in the law threaten to halt further growth. This Note
argues that poorly crafted legislation threatens to cast a substantial
amount of traditionally protected advocacy under the shadow of
terrorism, and this threat is intensified by a recent judicial decision
that is likely to criminalize a significant amount of speech in need of
First Amendment protection.
Part I of this Note briefly addresses the modern animal rights
movement and its early achievements. It further discusses how the
perception of animal rights supporters was transformed from peaceful
reformers willing to fight for even the smallest of causes to militant
extremists aimed at ending science. Part II addresses how Congress
responded to this new image by enacting the Animal Enterprise
Protection Act of 1992 (“AEPA”).3 In addition, Part II analyzes the
recent decision in United States v. Fullmer,4 the only judicial decision
to interpret AEPA. It argues that the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit’s determination that advocacy of a future illegal
act is capable of meeting the Brandenburg standard of incitement and
its application of the “true threats” doctrine to public communications
places the free speech rights of activists in jeopardy. Part III addresses
the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“AETA”),5 a controversial and
highly criticized amendment to the Animal Enterprise Protection Act.
This Note argues that its reliance on expansive terms, which other
courts have interpreted as inescapably intertwined with speech, brings
AETA squarely into the realm of First Amendment scrutiny. In
addition, its inconsistent use of expansive terms allows its plainly
legitimate sweep to proscribe a substantial amount of protected
speech. Part III further argues that in light of judicial decisions
interpreting statutes similar in terms and structure, AETA is not a
content-neutral restriction on speech and is not narrowly tailored to
meet a legitimate state interest. Finally, for many of the same reasons
that it is overbroad, AETA is unconstitutionally vague in that it fails
to provide fair notice of what conduct it prohibits and obliges those
entrusted to enforce its provisions to make key policy decisions on an
ad hoc and subjective basis.

3
4
5

Pub. L. No. 102–346, 106 Stat. 928 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)).
584 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 2009).
18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MODERN ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
A. Who Are Animal Rights Activists?
While the belief that animals possess “rights” necessitating
treatment commensurate to humans has antecedents in antiquity, the
modern animal rights movement emerged approximately three
decades ago.6 Proponents of animal rights are divided between those
who believe animals possess rights or inherent value,7 and those who
believe it is only animals’ capacity to suffer that must be
acknowledged.8 Despite these philosophical differences, the animal
rights movement is “committed to a number of goals, including: the
total abolition of the use of animals in science; the total dissolution of
commercial animal agriculture; [and] the total elimination of
commercial and sport hunting and trapping.”9 Activists are most often

6
The history of animal rights can be traced to at least 260 B.C.E. See PETER HARVEY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHISM: TEACHINGS, HISTORY AND PRACTICES 75–76 (1990)
(discussing emperor Asoka’s general shift to Buddhist principles during which he emphasized
the moral improvement of his citizens, including a focus on the humane treatment of animals
Many important facets of the modern animal rights movement came into being between the
mid-1970s and early-1980s. See, e.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR
OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS (1975) (arguing for the end of “speciesism” or the subjugation of
animal interests to human interests). The Animal Liberation Front, a clandestine animal rights
organization often considered militant, was formed in England in 1976. See Ann McWilliams,
Commentary, How Animal Rights Activists Threaten the Veterinary Profession, 30 CAN.
VETERINARY J. 716, 719 (1989) (commenting that the Animal Liberation Front is the militant
arm of the animal rights movement). People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals was formed in
1980. All About PETA, PETA, http://www.peta.org/about/learn-about-peta/default.aspx (last
visited Feb. 26, 2011). The first lawyer-centered animal protection society, the Animal Legal
Defense Fund, was created in 1979. See About Us, supra note 1. There were numerous highly
influential events and publications that predated this period, of course. See, e.g., JEREMY
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION, Ch. XVII, at
283 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789) ("[T]he question is not, Can
they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?”); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM,
LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 58 (Ernest Rhys, ed. Everyman’s Library 1936)
(1859) (noting Jeremy Bentham’s notion of conferring moral equality regardless of species
within the hedonic equation where “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”).
The first anti-vivisection societies were created in England in the 19th century and the American
Humane Society was created in 1954. Many scholars have compiled thorough histories of the
Animal Rights movement. See, e.g., Susan L. Goodkin, The Evolution of Animal Rights, 18
COLUM. HUM. RIGHTS. L. REV. 259 (1987).
7
See, e.g., TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983); PAUL W. TAYLOR,
RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1986); CHRISTOPHER D.
STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURALISM (1987); Tom Regan,
The Case for Animal Rights, in IN DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 13 (Peter Singer ed., 1985);
Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals
Reach? A Pluralist Perspective, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985).
8
See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 6.
9
TOM REGAN, The Case for Animal Rights, in ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION: THE MORAL
ISSUES 77, 77 (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1991).
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educated, upper middle-class, and white, and the movement is
overrepresented by women.10
B. Early Achievements of the Modern Animal Rights Movement
Within a few years of its formation, the American animal rights
movement had made considerable strides toward achieving its
ultimate goal of abolishing the use of animals in research, both
commercial and academic.11 The primary weapon in the animal rights
movement’s arsenal was evidence of animal abuse and legal
violations obtained by undercover journalists and whistleblowers,
who were known to volunteer for assignments at laboratories.12
Images and descriptions of laboratory conditions spurred strong
public sentiment. Two particularly high profile cases of demonstrated
abuse and legal violations at federally funded research institutions
propelled the animal rights movement into the public’s consciousness.
In 1981, police raided the Institute for Behavioral Research and
charged the lead scientist and an assistant with fifteen counts of
animal cruelty after a member of the newly formed People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals smuggled out pictures of laboratory
conditions.13 The evidence revealed that in order to imitate stroke-like
conditions, researchers routinely severed the spinal cords and nerves
10
See Shelley L. Galvin & Harold A. Herzog, Jr., Ethical Ideology, Animal Rights
Activism, and Attitudes Toward the Treatment of Animals, 2 ETHICS & BEHAV. 141, 141–49
(1992) (arguing that research reveals that the stereotypical profile is middle-aged, white, and
possessing at least a bachelor’s degree); McWilliams, supra note 6, at 717 (”The majority of
Animal Rights activists are white, fairly young, well-educated women.”); Eugene S. Uyeki &
Lani J. Holland, Diffusion of Pro-Environment Attitudes?, 43 AM. BEHAV. SCI., 646, 653,
(2000) (noting that some studies have indicated that women are more likely to support animals
rights than are men of similar socio-economic status). But see Adrian Franklin et al., Explaining
Support for Animal Rights: A Comparison of Two Recent Approaches to Humans, Nonhuman
Animals, and Postmodernity, 9 SOC’Y & ANIMALS 127, 139 (2001) (arguing that animal-rights
support is increasing independent of age, race, and education); Jerolmack, supra note 2, at 245
(reporting results of a study that did not support the stereotype of animal rights advocates as
upper-middle class, middle aged, and white, but found that young, less-educated, non-black
minorities were likely to support animal rights).
11
See DEBORAH RUDACILLE, THE SCALPEL AND THE BUTTERFLY: THE WAR BETWEEN
ANIMAL RESEARCH AND ANIMAL PROTECTION 157 (2000) (discussing amendments to the 1966
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act passed during the 1970s and 1980s that increased the regulation
of the use of animals in experimentation)).
12
See McWilliams, supra note 6, at 718 (describing the general activist infiltration
strategy and specific high-profile infiltrations). McWilliams warns other researchers to be weary
of individuals who volunteer or accept low level assignments because of the numerous instances
in which these “volunteers” were in fact animal rights activists who smuggled out evidence and
then used it against the laboratory. Id.
13
See Scientist, Assistant Face 15 Charges of Cruelty to Animals, WASH. POST, Sept 29,
1981, at B3 [hereinafter Charges] (“The chief scientist and an assistant at the Institute for
Behavioral Research were formally charged yesterday with 15 counts of animal cruelty
involving the research monkeys seized in a Silver Spring police raid . . . .”).
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within the arms of alert monkeys, crippled the arms and legs of many
more, and sewed shut the eyes of others to determine if they could
recover from such impairment.14 The stolen images revealed that the
animals were kept in unsanitary, thirteen-inch cages, and with wounds
undressed, sometimes with fingers or entire hands torn off.15 Soon
after the images were released, federal funding for the research was
discontinued and the researchers were arrested.16
In 1984, the animal rights organization Animal Liberation Front
released videotapes obtained from the University of Pennsylvania
Head Injury Clinic where researchers had developed a device that
inflicted an impact 2,000 times the force of gravity to a baboon’s
skull to simulate head injuries, which caused coma and paralysis.17
Excerpts from these videos were released and immediately attracted
worldwide media attention.18 “One excerpt showed a baboon
repeatedly writhing on a table as a hydraulic piston hit the animal’s
head. Just before the head injury, the animals were seen with their
eyes open, twisting on the table in an attempt to turn their bodies
over.”19 Other excerpts showed researchers severing a baboon’s ear
with a hammer and chisel while trying to remove the contraption and
researchers mocking the animals during experimentation.20 Federal
funding for the research was terminated after four days of sit-ins by
animal rights activists at the National Institute of Health’s
headquarters.21
Congress responded to the public outcry by amending the Animal
Welfare Act22 to increase oversight of animal research.23 The 1985
14

James J. Kilpatrick, Caged in Poolesville, WASH. POST, May 12, 1986, at A15; see also
Robert Reinhold, Fate of Monkeys, Deformed for Science, Causes Human Hurt After 6 Years,
N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1987, at 8 (noting that the monkeys garnered so much public sympathy
that Robert C. Smith, a Republican Congressman from New Hampshire, offered to purchase the
monkeys himself so that he could assure them a place in an animal sanctuary).
15
Kilpatrick, supra note 14; see also Reinhold, supra note 14.
16
Charges, supra note 13; see also Kilpatrick, supra note 14 (citing statements by the
chief executive officer of the National Institute of Health noting that the accused researcher
discontinued his research efforts in the absence of further NIH funding).
17
Tom L. Beauchamp et al., Head Injury Experiments on Primates at the University of
Pennsylvania, in THE HUMAN USE OF ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL CHOICE, supra note
2, at 177–79 (Tom L. Beauchamp, et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Head Injuries].
18
Id. at 179.
19
Id.
20
See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 179–84 (1995)
(providing a detailed account of the incidents).
21
Head Injuries, supra note 17, at 181–82; see also McWilliams, supra note 6, at 718–19
(detailing the events and describing PETA's tactics as unethical, although effective)).
22
Laboratory Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. 89–544, 80 Stat 350, (1966) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2006)) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the
transportation, sale, and handling of animals intended to be used for research or
experimentation). The Laboratory Animal Welfare Act’s stated objective was to prevent
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amendments urged researchers to find alternative methods to those
likely to inflict pain on subjects.24 The amendments also required that
research centers establish an Animal Welfare Information Center and
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee25 to review all uses of
animals in research.26
C. Industry Responses to the Modern Animal Rights Movement
Public criticism over the use of animals in research was
mounting.27 The cosmetic industry, recognizing the commercial
benefit of “cruelty-free” products, quickly modified its practices and
became one of the most ardent supporters of alternative testing
methods.28 Unlike the retail industry, which saw alternative testing as
a profitable and therefore beneficial endeavor, the biomedical
research community viewed these “achievements” as a potentially
devastating affront to science and an attempt by anti-intellectuals to
control research.29
companion animals from being stolen from homes for research. Ensuring a level of treatment for
animals used in research was only its tertiary purpose. Id.
23
Pub. L. 99–198, § 1751(3), 1756(b), 99 Stat. 1354, 1645, 1650 (1985) (broadening the
definition of “animal” and recognizing that “measures which eliminate or minimize the
unnecessary duplication of experiments on animals can result in more productive use of Federal
Funds”).
24
Food Security Act, 7 U.S.C § 2143(a)(7) (2006).
25
See id. § 2143(e) (information center); id. § 2143(b)(1) (care and use committee).
26
RUDACILLE, supra note 11, at 157–58 (stating that the Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committees were developed to increase animal welfare and not the scientific value of the
research).
27
See id. at 161 (discussing the increased public concern with respect to cosmetics testing
on animals). On April 15, 1980, a full-page advertisement by the Coalition to Abolish the
Draize Test appeared in the New York Times. The words “HOW MANY RABBITS HAS
REVLON BLINDED FOR BEAUTY’S SAKE?” were superimposed over a picture of a rabbit
about to have a chemical solution forced into its eyes. Id. The Draize Test is used to determine
the eye irritancy of many products. It usually consists of restraining a rabbit in an enclosure
where only its head remains visible, and chemicals are placed in the rabbit’s eyes. Rabbits are
primarily used in the experiments because they lack tear ducts and therefore are incapable of
flushing the solution. This allows researchers to monitor the effects for greater periods of time,
usually one week. For a full discussion of the Draize Test, see RUDACILLE, supra note 11, at
160–61, and for images of the Draize Test, see SINGER, supra note 6, at 142.
28
See RUDACILLE, supra note 11, at 161 (“Within a year [Revlon] had donated $750,000
to the Rockefeller Institute to fund research into alternatives to the Draize [Test].”); see also
Cruelty-Free, supra note 2, at 201 (“It has become increasingly apparent that the public does not
want products that have been tested on laboratory animals, so many companies have ended their
testing.”).
29
RUDACILLE, supra note 11, at 158. Rudacille states that many researchers viewed this
legislation as an attack on academic freedom and another hurdle to obtaining grants for research.
However, she also notes the perversity of this reaction because the use of animals in research
had been steadily declining since the late 1960s. Id.; see also Head Injuries, supra note 17, at
185 (chronicling the extreme reactions by the research community to the termination of funding
for the University of Pennsylvania Head Injury experiments); William A. Gibson, Editorial, The
Animal Rights War on Biomedical Research: A Call to Arms, 69 J. OF DENTAL RES. 1703, 1704
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Many researchers perceived the animal rights movement as an
attack on their scholarship and personally vowed to oppose not only
the animal rights movement, but also any legislation aimed at limiting
the use of animals in research.30 The research community responded
by lobbying Congress and reframing the debate over animal
research.31 They described evidence gathered by whistleblowers as
“faked” or “fabricated.”32 The techniques employed by researchers in
the Silver Spring and University of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinic
cases, which led to dozens of animal cruelty charges and Animal
Welfare Act violations, were described as “debatable,”33 and the
animal rights advocates who revealed these violations were described
as “unethical” for impeding research.34 Supporters of animal welfare
(1990) (describing the animal rights movement as “essentially anti-intellectual and antiscientific”).
30
See Gibson, supra note 29, at 1703 (calling on members of the biomedical community
to oppose such legislation, and support legislation that criminalizes break-ins and acts of
vandalism committed by animal rights protesters at research facilities). Gibson continues:
We, as members of [the biomedical] community, whether we use animals in our
research or not, have a responsibility to help thwart the efforts of those who seek to
end the use of animals in research . . . . The time has come for all of us in the
biomedical research community to do our part in actively opposing the animal rights
movement . . . .
Id. at 1703–04.
31
In direct response to the efforts of animal welfare supporters, the National Association
for Biomedical Research (“NABR”) was formed. Originally formed in 1979 as the Research
Animal Alliance, and changing its name to the NABR in 1981, the NABR represents animal
research-related firms in the courts and on Capitol Hill. It opposes many regulations and
restrictions placed on the use of animals in research and is the only lobby group that advocates
solely for the use of animals in research. See A Voice in Government, NAT’L ASS’N FOR
BIOMED. RESEARCH, http://www.nabr.org/About_NABR/Government.aspx (last visited Feb. 26,
2011) [hereinafter Voice in Government]; see also NAT’L ASS’N FOR BIOMED. RESEARCH, 25
YEARS OF ADVOCATING SOUND PUBLIC POLICY 3 (2005), available at http://www.nabr.org/
Portals/8/NABR_25th _revised-LR.pdf [hereinafter Public Policy] (stating that NABR’s
“membership comprises more than 300 . . . animal research-related firms,” and noting its current
political influence, and crediting NABR with passing the majority of legislation that has
restricted the animal rights movement); Coco Ballantyne, The Lobbying Landscape and Beyond:
15 Groups to Know, 14 NATURE MED. 1002, 1003 (2008) (“Established in 1979 when the
scientific community was coming under increased scrutiny from animal rights groups, NABR
now represents around 300 institutions involved in animal research.”).
32
See Gibson, supra note 29, at 1703 (“‘Evidence’ of inhumane or cruel treatment of
animals has been faked, and statements about the purpose and nature of the research have been
fabricated.”).
33
See McWilliams, supra note 6, at 718 (stating that at Silver Spring, PETA “found
unsanitary conditions and debatable animal care”) (emphasis added).
34
See Public Policy, supra note 31, at 4–5 (negatively chronicling the activities of animal
rights activists against research laboratories from the early 1980s to the present day). Under the
heading “Combating a movement meant to immobilize research: Over the years, animal rights
groups have proven themselves savvy, sophisticated and unrelenting in their aim to halt
biomedical research,” NABR refers to the animal-rights successes in the Silver Spring Monkey
Case and the University of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinic as “stunts” by an “extremist group.”
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in general were described as “terrorist[s],” “extremists,” and
“misguided fanatics”35 bent on immobilizing research.36
In 1988, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) began
combating the animal rights movement through a series of
unpublished “White Papers.”37 Shortly thereafter, an internal AMA
document titled “Animal Research Action Plan” was leaked to the
animal rights organization PETA.38 The document urged individual
researchers to take a “strong concerted effort” to “shrink the size of
the sympathizers” by isolating “the hardcore activists from the
general public . . . by exploiting the differences that already exist over
goals and tactics – especially the use of violence.”39 The document
recommended that “[t]he animal activist movement must be shown to
be not only anti-science but also a) responsible for violent and illegal
acts that endanger life and property and b) a threat to the public’s
freedom of choice.”40 The document further promoted the formation
Id. at 4. The NABR now describes the Silver Spring monkey case as one of many stunts and
illegal acts that have garnered public attention in their war against science. NABR writes,
“PETA (People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals), the movement’s most familiar group,
formed in 1980 and gained notoriety by leading the charge in the case of the ‘Silver Springs
Monkeys,’ . . . [where] activists claimed their first major victory in their war to end all animal
research.” Id. Emboldened by these successes, “U.S. groups orchestrated major raids to
confiscate animals, particularly at primate research facilities. Their stunts garnered a vast
amount of press coverage on the use of laboratory animals.” Id.; see also Tzachi Zamir, Killing
for Knowledge, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 17, 19–29 (2006) (providing a detailed exposition of many
of the arguments used in pro-vivisection literature); Arthur S. Brisbane, HHS Sanction Against
Animal Research Upheld, WASH. POST, Jun. 16, 1984, at B3 (reporting that the Department of
Health and Human Services upheld the termination of the National Institutes of Health research
grant because of inhumane treatment of the animals, which it concluded was unavoidable given
the nature of the experiments).
35
See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 29, at 1703–04 (arguing that proponents of animal rights
are anti-intellectual, anti-scientific, and “misguided fanatics” whose aim is to place the welfare
of the public at risk by ending research).
36
See Public Policy, supra note 31, at 4–5. (describing the historical threat that the animal
rights movement has posed to the biomedical research community since its inception in the
early 1980s).
37
See AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, USE OF ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH:
THE CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE, AMA WHITE PAPER (Mar. 1988); see also TOM REGAN,
EMPTY CAGES: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 12 (2004) (discussing the AMA
White Paper and its effect on the animal rights movement).
38
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ANIMAL RESEARCH ACTION PLAN 2 (1989)
(unpublished internal document) (on file with author); see also DEBORAH BLUM, THE MONKEY
WARS 145 (1994) (discussing the AMA’s Attempt to undermine the animal rights movement
through its Animal Research Action Plan); HAROLD D. GUITHER, ANIMAL RIGHTS: HISTORY
AND SCOPE OF A RADICAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT 123 (1998) (explaining the steps taken by the
AMA in the late 1980s, including the publication of its White Paper and the development of the
Animal Research Action Plan).
39
See ANIMAL RESEARCH ACTION PLAN, supra note 38, at 2.
40
Id.; see also Steven J. Smith & William R. Hendee, Animals in Research, 259 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 2007 (1988) (advocating that physicians take an active role defending animal
research not only at the national level but at the local and even personal level). Many
researchers have supported these recommendations because of their belief that if the animal
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of a special investigative unit to monitor animal rights activities.41
The AMA’s recommendations were borne out by the case of Fran
Trutt discussed below.
D. The Marriage of Animal Rights and Terrorism
U.S. Surgical, a manufacturer of medical supplies, was long
targeted by animal rights activists for its practice of using live dogs in
its sales demonstrations.42 Acting on a tip from an informant, police
arrested Fran Trutt, an animal rights supporter, on November 11,
1988, after she placed a pipe bomb at U.S. Surgical’s headquarters.43
Trutt was charged with attempted murder.44 U.S. Surgical was quick
to condemn the act as “an example of growing fanaticism in the
animal-rights movement.”45 The attempted bombing immediately
made national headlines and instilled fear that supporters of animal
rights had become militant extremists.46 Only two weeks after the
arrest, Time Magazine reported, “Trutt’s arrest raised the possibility
that the animal-rights movement, which in the past has confined itself
to public appeals, lobbying for anticruelty legislation and an
occasional raid on research facilities to free the animals inside, has
entered a terroristic phase.”47
Months after the would-be bombing made national headlines, U.S.
Surgical acknowledged that several months before the arrest it had
hired a surveillance company to infiltrate an animal rights group and
rights movement were to prevail, the future of science would be bleak. See, e.g., Jerod M. Loeb
et al., Human vs Animal Rights: In Defense of Animal Research, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2716
(1989) (condensing an analysis by the AMA regarding the use of animals in research and
concluding that although animals should be treated as humanely as possible, animal research is
essential to investigating medical advances). Many scholarly works discuss the AMA White
Paper and its recommendations at length. See, e.g., REGAN, supra 9, at 12 (arguing that the
AMA document was a substantial contributor to the backlash against activists in the 1980s and
1990s).
41
See ANIMAL RESEARCH ACTION PLAN, supra note 38, at 10.
42
See Carole Bass, Animal Activists: Target of Covert Campaign?, CONN. LAW TRIBUNE,
December 19, 1991, at 1, 5 (noting that U.S. Surgical was long targeted by animal rights
activists for the “company’s practice of cutting live dogs, then stapling their intestines” during
sales demonstration and the subsequent killing of the dogs after each sales demonstration).
43
A Serious Case of Puppy Love, TIME, Nov. 28, 1988, at 24 (providing a brief overview
of Trutt’s actions, her arrest, and the parties in the case); see also Celestine Bohlen, AnimalRights Case: Terror or Entrapment,?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1989, at B1 (reporting on the arrest
of Fran Trutt and describing the growing concern of the police and the biomedical companies of
potentially violent acts by protesters).
44
Pipe Bomb Suspect Offers No-Contest Plea: Animal Activist Trutt Charged in Murder
Attempt, NEWSDAY (USA), Apr. 17, 1990.
45
Bohlen, supra note 43, at B1.
46
See RUDACILLE, supra note 11, at 156 (discussing the exploitation of the Trutt case by
the biomedical community to raise fear about future threats by animal activists).
47
A Serious Case of Puppy Love, supra note 43, at 24 (emphasis added).
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befriend Trutt,48 and that the surveillance company stated that it was
paid by U.S. Surgical to orchestrate the bombing in order to portray
the animal rights movement as militant.49 The Norwalk police
allegedly participated in the setup.50 Trutt’s attorney linked the bombs
to the surveillance company and established a sufficiently close
relationship between U.S. Surgical and the police to argue
entrapment.51 Fearful that the prosecution would make good on its
announcement that it would play tapes recorded during the
surveillance that would reveal Trutt’s secret lesbian relationship, Trutt
pled no contest to attempted murder in exchange for a reduced
sentence.52 Because there was no trial, the seemingly illegal dealings
of U.S. Surgical and the Norwalk police were never brought to the
public’s attention, and the perception that animal rights had entered a
“terroristic phase” was born.53
48
See RUDACILLE, supra note 11, at 155 (discussing the argument presented by Trutt’s
attorney that U.S. Surgical knew about Trutt’s hatred for its president and knew of Trutt’s plans
through surveillance and informants); Diane Alters, Spies for Profit Track Social Activists,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 14, 1989, at A12 (reporting on the actions of Mary Louise Sapone, an
employee at a security firm hired by U.S. Surgical, who infiltrated an animal rights group in
Norwalk and befriended Trutt); Bohlen, supra note 43, at B4 (discussing efforts by agents of
Perceptions International, a security consultant company hired by U.S. Surgical, to infiltrate
animal rights protests, befriend Trutt, and report back to U.S. Surgical’s president, Leon
Hirsch); Nick Ravo, U.S. Surgical Admits Spying on Animal-Rights Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 1989, at B1 (reporting that the president of U.S. Surgical, Leon Hirsh, admitted that he had
hired informants to infiltrate animal rights organizations, but he denied allegations of
entrapment).
49
See Ravo, supra note 48, at B1 (discussing U.S. Surgical’s admission that it sent agents
to infiltrate animal rights groups).
50
See Bohlen, supra note 43, at B4 (reporting the alleged instructions of the Norwalk
police department to Perceptions International informants to help Trutt take the bomb to U.S.
Surgical’s headquarters); see also RUDACILLE, supra note 11, at 152 (discussing that Marcus
Mead, of Perceptions International later told reporters that he was given explicit instructions
regarding where to park when he drove Trutt to U.S. Surgical with the bomb because the “police
wanted us to be in the fenced area so that when they came after us, she would have no way of
escaping”).
51
See Bohlen, supra note 43, at B4 (detailing evidence cited by Trutt’s attorney that U.S.
Surgical monitored Trutt’s actions through surveillance, paid informants, and knew of her
bombing plan in advance); see also RUDACILLE, supra note 11, at 155 (noting that the
prosecution had recordings of Trutt’s conversations with informants expressing her “desire to
kill Leon Hirsch”).
52
See John T. McQuiston, Woman Enters No-Contest Plea in a Bomb Plot, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 17, 1990, at B3 (reporting that Fran Trutt contested all the facts of the case but chose to
plea bargain because the prosecution was prepared to introduce recordings that detailed her
sexual relationship with a female lover).
53
See Bohlen, supra note 43, at B4 (discussing the attitude of the president of Perceptions
International regarding the potential threat of violent actions by animal rights groups); see also
Larry Horton, The Enduring Animal Issue, 25 IN VITRO CELL. & DEV. BIOLOGY 486, 489 (1989)
(noting that while the animal rights movement had not caused the death of any human, the then
pending prosecution of Trutt was an indication of the increased violence and likely deaths that
would be caused by animal rights activists in the future).
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Shortly after Trutt’s arrest, an industry newsletter describing this
new era of animal rights extremism was disseminated throughout the
research community.
Just as the shooting down of a civilian Rhodesian airliner by a
local terrorist group in the 1970’s created an environment in
which murderous attacks like the Achille Laro incident could
be conceived and implemented by dedicated extremists, so
might Trutt's action stand as a milestone for the Animal
Rights Movement.54
Within one year of Trutt’s arrest, animal rights organizations were
added to the FBI’s list of domestic terrorist organizations.55
II. THE ANIMAL ENTERPRISE PROTECTION ACT
A. The Legislative Response to Animal Rights Terrorism
The Trutt incident cause substantial anxiety, and almost
immediately, the biomedical community began pressuring Congress
for tighter restrictions on animal rights activists.56 Congress
responded to concerns that animal rights had entered an era of
extremism by enacting the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992
(“AEPA”)57 less than a year after Trutt pled no contest to attempted
murder.58 While the sparse legislative history reveals that AEPA was
aimed solely at halting extreme acts of violence against certain
institutions, AEPA’s drafters unfortunately relied on the amorphous
term “physical disruption” in criminalizing acts against animal
enterprises.59 The House Judiciary Committee immediately expressed
54

A Violent Edge, ANIMAL RTS. REP., Dec. 1988, at 11
See Gibson, supra note 29, at 1703 (noting that the Animal Liberation Front was named
a domestic terrorist organization in 1988).
56
See PETER SINGER, ETHICS INTO ACTION: HENRY SPIRA AND THE ANIMAL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 156 (1998) (noting that the early 1990s saw a tremendous backlash against animal
rights activists and recounting an incident on June 10, 1990 when Louis Sullivan, then Secretary
of Health and Human Services, referred to 25,000 animal rights protestors in Washington D.C.
as terrorists).
57
Pub. L. 102–346, 106 Stat. 928 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006)); see
also Public Policy, supra note 31, at 7 (“NABR led the initiative to pass the Animal Enterprise
Protection Act of 1992, making it a federal offense to destroy research. This was the first of
several NABR-endorsed pieces of legislation designed to protect research facilities and
individuals targeted by animal rights groups.”).
58
Fran Trutt entered a plea of no contest to attempted murder and possession of
explosives on April 16, 1990. See Animal-Rights Activist Gets 32 Months, WASH. TIMES, July
18, 1990, at A6.
59
See § 2, 106 Stat. at 928 (“[I]ntentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning
55
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concerns that “physical disruption” is an ambiguous term, and that
without clarification it could be used to prosecute what have
traditionally been legally protected activities merely because they
affect an animal enterprise.60 Congress ultimately provided a
definition of “physical disruption,” but it failed to remedy the
statute’s ambiguity.61 It defined a “physical disruption” as a
disruption that is not lawful, but since Congress failed to provide a
definition of what disruptions are lawful, the definition added little
clarity.62 In addition, the exemption for lawful disruption placed
criminal liability in the hands of third parties because it only
exempted a disruption that “results from lawful public, governmental,
or animal enterprise employee reaction to the disclosure of
information about an animal enterprise.”63 This definition grounds
criminal liability not in the lawfulness of the initial disclosure or
conduct, but in the public, governmental, or animal enterprise
employee’s reaction to that disclosure or conduct, which itself raises
constitutional concerns.64 Despite these concerns, there was only
speculation about AEPA’s practical application prior to the Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty campaign.65

of an animal enterprise . . . .”) (emphasis added). See generally Michael Hill, Comment, The
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: The Need for a Whistleblower Exception, 61 CASE. W. RES.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (providing a detailed discussion of AEPA’s history).
60
See H.R. REP. NO. 102–498(II), at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 816, 818
(“The ambiguous term ‘physical disruption’ is not defined, and could be construed to make
criminal whistleblowing activity that results in a facility being shut down by regulators or
protests. At best, this would have chilled whistleblowing; at worst, it could have resulted in
actual prosecutions of whistleblowers.”).
61
See Animal Enterprise Control Act, Pub. L. 102–346, 106 Stat. at 929 (“[T]he term
‘physical disruption’ does not include any lawful disruption that results from lawful public,
governmental, or animal enterprise employee reaction to the disclosure of information about an
animal enterprise . . . .”) When Congress codified the Animal Enterprise Control Act, it changed
“physical disruption” to “economic damage.” See 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(3) (2006) (“[T]he term
‘economic damage’ . . . does not include any lawful economic disruption (including a lawful
boycott) that results from lawful public, governmental, or business reaction to the disclosure of
information about an animal enterprise . . . .”).
62
Animal Enterprise Control Act, 106 Stat. at 929.
63
Id. (emphasis added).
64
See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) (holding that
liability may not be imputed from the audience to the speaker unless there is a substantial
showing of improper motives of all parties). The problematic definition of “physical disruption”
in the Animal Enterprise Protection Act was later included as the definition of “economic
disruption” in the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.ii.
65
See Laura G. Kniaz, Comment, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the
Underground Railroad, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 765, 818 n.296 (1995) (expressing concerns over
AEPA’s application because it was duplicative of state laws that proscribed the same conduct
and speculating about its reach).
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B. United States v. Fullmer
In 1997, a British journalist gained employment at Huntingdon
Life Sciences and released videos of researchers’ repeated violations
of animal welfare laws, which ultimately led to 48 citations.66 Of all
the events caught on tape, the beating of a four-month-old beagle
puppy and the dissection of a live monkey received the most
attention.67 The footage evoked a strong emotional response from
activists and the public.68 The animal rights organization, Stop
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (“SHAC”), was created in direct
response to these videos.69
SHAC’s purpose was to oppose what it perceived as animal
cruelty at Huntingdon Life Sciences by making available information
and organizing protests that would lead to the company’s ultimate
downfall.70 SHAC’s website served as its primary tool for organizing
protest campaigns.71 The website contained a page dedicated to
“direct action,” a phrase used to denote action taken directly against
the source of opposition and commonly used to refer to illegal means
of protest.72 It stated:
We operate within the boundaries of the law, but recognize
and support those who choose to operate outside the confines
of the legal system.
...

66
See Ethan Carson Eddy, Privatizing the Patriot Act: The Criminalization of
Environmental and Animal Protectionists as Terrorists, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV 261, 269 n.35
(2005) (describing the clandestine journalism that spawned outrage against Huntingdon Life
Sciences and providing a list of the charges levied against Huntingdon Life Sciences that
ultimately resulted in 32 citations for violating the Animal Welfare Act and 16 citations for
violating the Good Laboratory Practices Act); see also Lee Hall, Disaggregating the Scare
From the Greens, 33 VT. L. REV. 689, 702 (2009) (reporting that Stop Huntingdon Animal
Cruelty’s website indicated that Huntingdon Life Sciences had also falsified data and “violat[ed]
Good Laboratory Practice laws over 600 times”) (quoting SHAC 7, What is HLS?,
http://shac7.com/hls.htm (last visited May 14, 2009)).
67
See Will Potter, The Beagle Brigade: A Law That Tells Animal Rights Activists to Heel,
LEGAL AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2004, at 11 (discussing the events captured on video).
68
See id. (discussing the response to the notorious events).
69
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 139 (3d. Cir. 2009) (recounting the facts
relating to the formation of Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty).
70
See id. at 139–42 (describing the specific tactics utilized by Stop Huntingdon Animal
Cruelty).
71
Id. at 139 (“SHAC’s primary organizing tool is its website, through which members
coordinate future protests.”).
72
Id. (“The website includes a page dedicated to the concept of ‘direct action,’ which all
parties concede is a type of protest that includes the illegal activity in this case.”).
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SHAC does not organize any such actions or have any
knowledge of who is doing them or when they will happen,
but [SHAC] encourage[s] people to support direct action
when it happens and those who may participate in it.73
The website allowed users to post updates directly to the website,
and many of the updates reported incidents of illegal activity
committed by activists claiming to be unaffiliated with SHAC,
including several instances of property damage committed in the
U.S.74 Accompanying each of these reports was a disclaimer stating
that SHAC neither organizes nor engages in illegal activity.75 The
website also provided information that personally identified
Huntingdon Life Sciences executives and the executives of
companies that transacted with Huntingdon, including their names,
phone numbers, and addresses.76 In addition, the website urged
visitors to engage in electronic civil disobedience on the first Monday
of each month by sending numerous emails or faxes to companies
associated with Huntingdon Life Sciences.77 In 2004, six SHAC
members were convicted of conspiracy to violate AEPA for operating
the SHAC website.78
In United States v. Fullmer, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, the only appellate court to review AEPA’s
language, upheld the convictions.79 The only issues before the court
were whether AEPA was void for vagueness and, if not, whether the
defendants’ pure speech violated its conspiracy provision.80 The court
rejected the defendants’ arguments that AEPA was void for
vagueness and that their speech was protected by the First
73

Id. (alterations in original).
See id. at 142–47 (detailing a number of incidents of property damage at Huntingdon
Life Science employees’ homes including spray painting messages on garage doors, breaking
doors and windows, throwing smoke bombs, throwing paint on the front walk of a home, and
placing stickers with pictures of mutilated animals on a house, the majority of which were
attributed to the Animal Liberation Front).
75
Id. at 140 (“These bulletins almost always contained a disclaimer that ‘all illegal
activity is done by anonymous activists who have no relation with SHAC.’”).
76
Id. at 142.
77
Id. at 141 (“Electronic civil disobedience involves a coordinated campaign by a large
number of individuals to inundate websites, e-mail servers, and the telephone service of a
targeted company.”).
78
Id. at 151.
79
Id. at 137.
80
Id. The only charge before the court was whether the defendants’ speech on the internet
constituted a conspiracy to violate AEPA. They were not accused of committing any acts of
vandalism, property destruction, criminal trespass, or illegal conduct other than their pure
speech.
74
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Amendment.81 In the course of upholding the convictions, the court
committed three critical errors: (1) it failed to provide any explanation
for its holding that “physical disruption” is not vague; (2) it vastly and
inappropriately expanded on the Brandenberg test in finding that
SHAC’s advocating electronic civil disobedience amounted to
incitement; and (3) it did not explain why, under existing precedent,
the defendant’s public speech was a “true threat.”82
1. AEPA Not Void for Vagueness
The defendants argued that “physical disruption” is ambiguous and
therefore failed to provide fair warning of what activity AEPA
prohibited.83 The court rejected this argument and held that “the term
‘physical disruption’ has a well-understood, common definition.”84
The court cited no authority for this determination either with respect
to judicial decisions interpreting “physical disruption” or similar
terms or by other reference.85 The court merely asserted that “physical
disruption” is a common phrase with a common meaning, but the
court never articulated this meaning.86 In light of the fact that AEPA’s
legislative history reveals serious concerns about the ambiguity of this
term and its likelihood to result in multiple, conflicting
interpretations, the court should have undertaken a more exacting
analysis.87
In addition to holding that “physical disruption” has a common
meaning and is therefore not vague, the court held that by operating
the SHAC website in the manner that they did, the defendants were
on notice that their speech was “clearly within the heartland of the
statute.”88 The court premised this holding on SHAC’s use of

81
See id. at 151–56 (holding that Animal Enterprise Protection Act was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied, did not criminalize constitutionally protected speech, and
refusing to consider a facial challenge because the court found that defendant did not have
standing to challenge other than on an as-applied basis).
82
See id.
83
Id. at 151–52 (“Defendants argue that the statute has a chilling effect on speech because
protestors will refrain from all speech, even protected speech, due to the ambiguity of what the
statute proscribes.”).
84
Id. at 153.
85
The court did not provide evidence of a single case, treatise, periodical, dictionary or
any other source that supported this conclusion. See id.
86
See id. The court does not provide any greater rationale than that “physical disruption”
has a common meaning, and it fails to clarify why or how this is so, or even what that meaning
is.
87
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
88
Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 153.
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encryption software.89 The court reasoned that because encryption
software can be used to evade law enforcement by preventing third
parties from monitoring emails and erasing sensitive data, it was
evidence of SHAC’s consciousness of guilt.90 The court, however,
failed to consider the numerous lawful reasons for using encryption
software, including the very reasons articulated by the court, to
prevent third parties from monitoring emails or to otherwise protect
sensitive data for purely innocent purposes.91
2. SHAC’s Speech Was Not Protected by the First Amendment
The Constitution mandates an open marketplace of ideas.92 An
open marketplace of ideas requires the open and unrestricted
dissemination of political, social, religious and other beliefs and
viewpoints, many of which not only conflict with but are offensive to
customary thought.93 Because society as a whole benefits from the
truth derived from these diverse views, the interests at stake are not
merely those of the speaker but include the public's interest in hearing
all sides of the debate.94 Recognizing that freedom of speech is of
paramount importance to a free society, the Supreme Court has made
clear that its protection is almost absolute.95 Despite near absolute
89
Id. (“The record is rife with evidence that Defendants were on notice that their activities
put them at risk for prosecution, including the extensive use of various encryption devices and
programs used to erase incriminating data from their computer hard drives.”)
90
See id.
91
See, e.g., Ken Belson, Hackers Are Discovering a New Frontier: Internet Telephone
Service, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at C4 (recommending the use of encryption software to
protect against hackers); John Markoff, A Method for Stealing Critical Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 2008, at C1 (noting that encryption software is widely used in computers to prevent the loss
of data by third-party actions).
92
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
theory of our Constitution” is “that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market”).
93
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 366 (2003) (noting that the burning of a cross at a
rally to support the Ku Klux Klan would be protected speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
420 (1989) (holding that burning the American flag at a rally is protected speech); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that an activist’s conditional
statement that he would shoot President Johnson was protected speech).
94
See Karl S. Coplan, Ideological Plaintiffs, Administrative Lawmaking, Standing, and
the Petition Clause, 61 ME. L. REV. 377, 445 (2009) (arguing that our system of selfgovernment is directly tied to the principle of the marketplace of ideas and its mandate that we
are able to hear all sides of the debate).
95
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377–78, 380 (1984) (“[It] is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
will ultimately prevail, . . . the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences . . . may not constitutionally be abridged . . . .”
(quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)).
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protection, the First Amendment does not protect certain categories of
speech because they are “of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.”96 Unprotected categories
of speech include incitement, fighting words, obscenity, defamatory
and libelous statements, and other harmful speech of only de minimis
social import.97
a. Inciting Speech
The Fullmer court held that the portion of SHAC’s website that
encouraged visitors to engage in electronic civil disobedience and
provided information about how to participate in virtual sit-ins was
not protected by the First Amendment because it incited
lawlessness.98 The court could have attempted to circumvent the
Brandenburg incitement standard by arguing that SHAC’s website
was “crime-facilitating speech,”99 a category of speech that is not
protected because it allows individuals to further a criminal act, but
instead the court explicitly relied on the Brandenburg standard.100
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,101 the Supreme Court overturned an Ohio
statute that prohibited advocating violence, sabotage, or unlawful
methods of terrorism and for assembling with any group that
advocates such uses for political or social reform. 102 Clarence
Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan leader, was arrested after a video aired
in which 12 hooded figures, many of whom were armed, gathered
around a burning cross in one scene, and in another scene
Brandenburg made a speech in which he stated that the KKK should
“[s]end the Jews back to Israel”, “[b]ury the niggers”, and obtain

96
Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting in dicta a list of
categorically unprotected speech, including “the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words”).
97
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (incitement);
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (“fighting words”); Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (“true threats”); N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (libel).
98
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We emphasize that much
of the speech on the website does not run afoul of the Brandenburg standard. . . . However, we
find that the posts that coordinate electronic civil disobedience . . . are more problematic.”).
99
See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1103 (2005)
(providing a review of tests, discussing the Supreme Court’s failure to address the issue, and
addressing the distinctions between crime-facilitating speech and the Brandenburg test).
100
Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 155 (“This type of communication is not protected speech under
the Brandenberg standard.”).
101
395 U.S. 444.
102
Id. at 444–45.
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“[f]reedom for the whites.”103 He also stated, “if our President, our
Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white,
Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some
revengeance taken.”104 In overturning the statute and Brandenburg’s
conviction, the Supreme Court created the Brandenburg test for
incitement:
[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action
and is likely to incite or produce such action.105
The Supreme Court has noted that it generally disfavors punishing
speech under the incitement doctrine because in almost all
circumstances it is better to punish the actor rather than the speaker.106
Under the Brandenburg test, however, speech can be proscribed when
the speech is intended to create lawlessness, where the speech is
likely to create lawlessness, and when such lawlessness is
imminent.107 Where the resulting illegal act is not imminent, the
advocacy that inspires the act is not proscribable under the incitement
doctrine.108
The incitement doctrine is premised on the notion that speech has
an explosive or arousing character that, when spoken in a certain
context, has the capacity to cause immediate illegal activity, and this
has often been associated with mob-like violence.109 The necessity of
103

Id. at 446 n.1.
Id. at 446.
105
Id. at 447.
106
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding that a radio commentator’s onair disclosure of an intercepted telephone conversation regarding union negotiations was
protected by the First Amendment).
107
See Volokh, supra note 99, at 1189 (noting that the Court’s intent-plus-imminence-plus
likelihood test was a large shift from the Court’s previous test, which only required intent and
likelihood, and was modified in order to allow more speech).
108
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–109 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that
imminence requires more than a likelihood of future crime).
109
See Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 113 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc) (holding that
a letter to the editor that advocated the murder of Muslims could not be considered incitement,
even though people were murdered shortly after its publication, because it was not spoken to a
mob but published in a newspaper); see also JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 56 (Stefan
Collini ed., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1859) (“An opinion that corn-dealers are
starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested when simply
circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an
excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer . . . .”).
104
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this explosive quality of speech makes the written medium ill-suited
to the incitement doctrine.110 While the Supreme Court has never
specifically addressed the issue of whether written words can satisfy
the Brandenburg standard, a number of courts have addressed this
question and have concluded that it cannot, and they have done so in
a wide variety of contexts, including published writings, letters, and
more recently emails and blogs.111 The Department of Justice has also
110
See Recent Decisions: The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 58
MD. L. REV. 1221, 1269 (1999) (noting that the poor fit between inciting speech and the written
word makes it uncertain that Brandenburg would apply to written material).
111
A number of courts have determined that published writings cannot meet the
Brandenburg standard, even if they instill an idea that causes the ultimate act. See Herceg v.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (in overturning a judgment
premised on the notion that the magazine’s publication of an article about auto-erotic
asphyxiation incited a person to attempt the act, during which he died, the court noted that the
written words at hand did not meet the Brandenburg test, but refused to speculate as to whether
written words might ever be capable of unprotected incitement); Thonen v. Jenkins, 491 F.2d
722, 723 n.3 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (holding that an editorial published in a university
newspaper could not be considered incitement); Citizen Publ’g, 115 P.3d at 113 (a letter to the
editor regarding the war in Iraq and proposing death of Muslims did not meet the test in
Brandenburg); People v. Keough, 290 N.E.2d 819, 820 (N.Y. 1972) (reversing appellate court
decision that writings and photographs could be restricted as likely to incite disorder). Contrast
Rice v. Paladin Enter., Inc., 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997), where the court held that the publisher
of a book entitled HIT MAN: A TECHNICAL MANUAL FOR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS could be
held civilly liable in a wrongful death action after a reader killed her eight-year-old quadriplegic
child and her child’s nurse. However, this decision was based on the publisher’s admission that
it “not only knew that its instructions might be used by murderers, but that it actually intended
to provide assistance to murderers and would-be murderers which would be used by them ‘upon
receipt,’ and that it in fact assisted [the murderer] in particular in the commission of the
murders . . . .” Id. at 242. The court went on to state that its holding was limited to the particular
facts of the case, including the admission, and the fact that “an inference of impermissible intent
on the part of the producer or publisher would be unwarranted as a matter of law.” Id. at 265–
66.
Courts looking at whether a letter sent to multiple individuals can constitute incitement
under the Brandenburg standard have concluded that it cannot. See, e.g., Delano Vill. Cos. v.
Orridge, 553 N.Y.S.2d 938, 942 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (dismissing case on the grounds that racist
letters sent to apartment owners advocating that they break civil rights laws by refusing to rent
to minority tenants were protected speech because, although sharp and unpleasant, written
statements cannot meet the Brandenburg standard).
More recently cases have arisen addressing whether the words written in email and on
blogs amount to incitement, and like other written contexts, the courts have been reluctant to
conclude that such communications can meet the Brandenburg standard. See United States v.
White, No. 7:08-CR-00054, 2010 WL 438088 at *13–14 (W.D. Va. Feb. 4, 2010) (granting
defendant’s motion for acquittal to a jury finding that he made true threats and incited violence
by email communication after he sent an email to a newspaper advocating for an anti-Jewish
uprising and a call to arms to overthrow the Canadian government on a finding that email
communications cannot be used to prove incitement because to do so would eviscerate the First
Amendment); see also David J. Loundy, E-Law 4: Computer Information Systems Law and
System Operator Liability, 21 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1075, 1115–1118 (1998) (arguing that while
the words posted to the Internet can constitute “true threats” or “fighting words,” because these
doctrines are dependent either on the intent of the speaker or the response of the listener
independent of when they were written, they cannot meet the imminence requirement of
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announced that Internet advocacy campaigns, even those that espouse
hate-based violent illegal activity, cannot be criminalized under the
Brandenburg standard because they cannot meet its imminence
requirement.112
Not only is the written word ill-suited to meeting the Brandenburg
imminence requirement, the specific facts addressed in Fullmer,
regardless of the medium used, fall far short of Brandenburg’s
imminence requirement. In Hess v. Indiana,113 the first incitement
case the Court decided after Brandenburg, the Court overturned Hess’
conviction for obstruction.114 Hess was arrested during an anti-war
demonstration at the University of Indiana when he yelled to a sheriff,
“We’ll take the fucking street later.”115 The Court held that Hess’
speech could not be prohibited because “at worst, it amounted to
nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future
time.”116 Although the Supreme Court has not provided a bright line
rule, commentators have argued, and lower courts have held, that
Hess requires that the illegal act immediately follow the speech,
where “‘[i]mmediately’ means within a period which does not give
time for reflection.”117
Brandenburg); cf. United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 449 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (holding that a
paratrooper’s online profile that advocated for white supremacy and anarchy as well as
espousing similar messages through internet communications could not meet the Brandenburg
test).
112
See COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED PROHIBITIONS AGAINST RACIST
PROPAGANDA ON THE INTERNET: THE U.S PERSPECTIVE, PRESENTED AT HATE SPEECH AND THE
INTERNET, BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Nov.
1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/racismun.htm (noting that there
has never been a case in which the publication of written works was found to meet the
Brandenburg standard and therefore speech on the Internet, no matter what its content, could
not either); see also Ronald J. Rychlak, Compassion, Hatred, and Free Expression, 27 MISS. C.
L. REV. 407, 422 (2008) (noting that the United States signed the Convention on Cybercrime
but refused to sign the Additional Protocol, which regulated hate speech, because most Internet
communications are generally protected to a greater degree in the United States than in Europe);
Yulia A. Timofeeva, Hate Speech Online: Restricted or Protected? Comparison of Regulations
in the United States and Germany, 12 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 253, 272 (2003) (noting that
the United States cannot sign the Additional Protocol because internet communications that
advocate violence or hatred are not inciting within the meaning of Brandenburg).
113
414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per curiam).
114
Id. at 108–09.
115
Id. at 107.
116
Id. at 108.
117
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 897 F. Supp. 1047, 1087 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(striking portions of a RICO complaint alleging that the defendant anti-abortion advocate’s
speech was the cause of multiple violent acts against abortion providers because although they
may have been the ultimate cause, the effect was not felt immediately after the speech was
made); see also Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1280–81 (D. Colo.
2002) (in dismissing a claim against a videogame manufacturer the court held that there must be
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The Fullmer court acknowledged that much of SHAC’s advocacy
could not meet the imminence requirement.118 The court concluded,
for example, that simply listing personally identifiable information on
their website was not incitment because the protests that the posting
inspired occurred a minimum of three weeks after it was made.119 The
court, however, did hold that SHAC’s email entitled “Electronic Civil
Disobedience” met the Brandenburg test.120 Although SHAC claimed
that it did not participate in direct action, as part of its advocacy
campaign SHAC encouraged people to engage in virtual sit-ins,
which it likened to traditional civil disobedience.121 The court
reasoned that because the email was entitled “Electronic Civil
Disobedience,” which denotes an illegal act, the “message
encouraged and compelled an imminent, unlawful act that was not
only likely to occur, but provided the schedule by which the unlawful
act was to occur.”122 Under the prevailing interpretation of
Brandenburg, however, the lawlessness that this email encouraged
was hardly imminent.123
As already discussed, the written word is poorly suited to the
incitement doctrine,124 and accordingly, it is highly questionable
whether an email has the arousing or explosive capacity that
incitement requires.125 It is difficult to conceptualize an email
recipient as similar to a member of an angry mob where upon hearing
a sufficiently close connection between speech and the corresponding action such that there is
not time for reflection and suggesting that this may not be possible in a case of written material);
Marc Rohr, Grand Illusion?: The Brandenburg Test and Speech That Encourages or Facilitates
Criminal Acts, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 12 (2002) (arguing that the Court’s decision in Hess
mandates an almost contemporaneous connection between the speech and the accompanying
act).
118
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We emphasize that
much of the speech on the website does not run afoul of the Brandenburg standard.”).
119
See id. at 155 n.10 (noting that the posting of the “Top Twenty Terror Tactics” on
March 6, 2001 could not be used as proof of inciting an unlawful act on March 31, 2001).
120
Id. at 155 (stating that the speech encourages imminent unlawfulness because it
provided a specific date for the virtual sit-in).
121
See id. at 139–41 (noting that SHAC’s website had a disclaimer stating that it did not
participate in direct action and did not know who did).
122
Id. at 155.
123
See text accompanying supra note 108 (noting the immediacy component that courts
have interpreted Brandenburg to require).
124
See supra notes 99–109 and accompanying text.
125
See United States v. White, No. 7:08-CR-00054, 2010 WL 438088, at *13–15 (W.D.
Va. Feb. 4, 2010) (holding that email was not inciting and noting that an email is poorly suited
to meeting Brandenburg’s imminence requirement); see also Loundy, supra note 108, at 1116
(arguing that email cannot meet Brandenburg, although instant messaging potentially could); cf.
United States v. Wilcox, 66 M.J. 442, 449 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (holding posted online material is
not inciting).
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highly provocative speech they spontaneously and thoughtlessly
act.126 Rather, these are individuals receiving a message on a personal
computer, which is much more similar to receiving a letter.127 The
court’s error goes beyond the problem of the medium, however. The
court stated that the email urging direct action was sent on October
26, 2003, but in an earlier portion of the opinion the court explicitly
stated, “SHAC sponsored monthly electronic civil disobedience
campaigns on the first Monday of every month.”128 This would mean
that SHAC was advocating an illegal activity that would, at the very
earliest, take place on Monday, November 3, 2003, at least eight days
after the message was sent, and perhaps significantly later.129 The
intervening period between SHAC’s sending the message and the
anticipated virtual sit-in exceeds Brandenburg’s requirement that
there be an immediate connection between the speech and the illegal
act.130 SHAC’s speech merely advocated participation in the virtual
sit-in and provided notice of when it would occur.131 Where at all
possible, punishment should be reserved for those who participate in
the illegal act and not those who advocate participation.132

126
See Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 113 (Ariz. 2005) (en banc) (holding that
a letter to the editor that advocated the murder of Muslims could not be considered incitement,
even though people were murdered shortly after its publication, because it was not spoken to a
mob but published in a newspaper); see also MILL, supra note 106, at 56 (“An opinion that
corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be unmolested
when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered
orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer . . . .”).
127
See Delano Vill. Cos. v. Orridge, 553 N.Y.S.2d 938, 942–43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(holding that letters advocating illegal activity and sent to private individuals cannot meet the
Brandenburg standard).
128
Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 141.
129
The court did not state when the virtual sit-in would take place. The next Monday of the
following month was November 3, 2003; however, the court did not indicate that the email was
urging participation in that particular sit-in or a later one or simply making a general statement
that SHAC encouraged participation in sit-ins. See id. (noting only that, in the October 26 email, a link would be provided the following day to the SHAC-Moscow website where the
electronic civil disobedience would take place).
130
See Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1281 (D. Colo. 2002)
(requiring a sufficiently close connection between speech and the corresponding act such that
the “speech at issue must be ‘likely’ to produce imminent lawless action” (citing Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (per curium))); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 897
F. Supp. 1047, 1087 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (“‘Immediately’ means within a period which does not
give time for reflection.”).
131
See Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 155 (sending an email and suggesting a date to engage in
virtual sit-ins).
132
See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (holding that advocacy is protected in all but the
most extreme circumstances, even where the speech advocates violent, hate-based, illegal
conduct).
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At most, SHAC’s website had the secondary effect of causing its
members to commit criminal acts, which is insufficient to place it
speech outside of First Amendment protection. The Supreme Court
held in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition133 that more than a showing
of likelihood to provoke illegal conduct is needed to for Internet
speech to be unprotected by the First Amendment.134 In Free Speech
Coalition, the federal government defended a law that made
possession of virtual child pornography a criminal offense.135 The
government’s principle contention was that virtual child pornography
is not protected speech because virtual images encourage pedophiles
to create actual images with children.136 In rejecting this argument,
the Court held that “the Government may not prohibit speech on the
ground that it may encourage . . . illegal conduct.”137
The Fullmer decision is troubling for a number of reasons but none
is greater than the effect that it will have on social justice campaigns.
The most pressing social transformations in this nation’s history were
directly furthered through civil disobedience, from the Boston Tea
Party, to the abolition of slavery, to women’s suffrage, and more
recently the civil rights struggle.138 Although few people deplore
133

535 U.S. 234 (2002).
See id. at 253–54 (“Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the
Government may not prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage
in illegal conduct.”).
135
Id. at 241.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 253–54.
138
It is well recognized that the Boston Tea Party of 1773 and the purposeful destruction
of property it involved was one the first acts of organized civil disobedience in United States
history. See CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 1, 8 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1991) (noting that the
Boston Tea Party of 1773 was a tactical destruction of property on political grounds).
Proponents of the abolition of slavery were well known for intentionally breaking laws as a
means of civil disobedience. See DANIEL B. STEVICK, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND THE CHRISTIAN
75 (1969) (noting that those who participated in the Underground Railroad, including
individuals like Harriet Tubman, spirited Quakers, and other abolitionists, all defiantly broke the
law in furtherance of their cause and that it was an act of civil disobedience in its purest form);
LARRY GARA, THE LIBERTY LINE: THE LEGEND OF THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD xii (1996
ed.) (noting that abolitionists openly violated federal and state laws by harboring slaves or
actually liberating slaves). The movement for women’s suffrage was driven by civil
disobedience ranging from non-violent protests to violent acts of dissent. See, e.g., SUFFRAGE
AND BEYOND: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 21 n.21 (Caroline Daley & Melanie
Nolan eds., 1994) (“Suffragettes chained themselves to railings, fire-bombed post boxes and
went on hunger strikes while imprisoned on civil disobedience charges.”). The Civil Rights
Movement in the Southern United States embodies the concept of civil disobedience as a
tactical measure in a long fought political struggle. See, e.g., THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
HANDBOOK: A BRIEF HISTORY AND PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR THE POLITICALLY DISENCHANTED
32 (James Tracy ed., 2002) (discussing the “freedom rides” of 1961 in which civil rights
workers would travel on segregated busses and break segregation laws); MORTON J. HORWITZ,
THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 38 (1998) (noting that the civil rights
134
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these acts in retrospect, civil disobedience itself has always been
illegal.139 The court’s decision takes this a step further, however, and
punishes not only the civil disobedience itself but those who advocate
for it.140 The court’s sweepingly broad holding assaults the very ideals
the First Amendment embodies and criminalizes the teachings
propounded by this Nation’s great civic champions, from Henry
David Thoreau to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., both of whom strongly
advocated illegal means of direct-action protest and provided specific
instructions on how to do so.141 Virtual sit-ins are the natural
evolution of direct-action, and, like other forms of civil disobedience,
they are illegal.142 But simply because they occur in a new medium
does not mean that those who advocate for them deserve fewer
constitutional protections.143
movement employed civil disobedience against segregation laws wherever they were found as a
way of forcing the effect of segregation into the oppressor’s mind).
139
See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985) (“People in the center as
well as on the left of politics give the most famous occasions of civil disobedience a good press,
at least in retrospect.”).
140
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that
encouraging direct action campaign was not protected speech).
141
See HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Civil Disobedience, (1849) reprinted in THE MAJOR
ESSAYS OF HENRY DAVID THOREAU 47, 47–67 (Richard Dillman ed., 2001). Thoreau’s
influential essay was originally titled “Resistance to Civil Government.” See Raymond Adams,
Thoreau’s Sources for “Resistance to Civil Government,” 42 STUDIES IN PHILOLOGY 640, 640
n.1 (1945) (“In 1903 the essay was first published separately by The Simple Life Press, London,
under the title On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, a title which has been frequently used
since.”). Thoreau’s work argued for opposition to an unjust government based on moral reasons
by, among others, refusing to pay taxes and disobey unjust laws, and was highly influential to
leaders of the civil rights movement in the American South. See MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. 14 (Clayborne Carson ed., 2001) (“I became
convinced that noncooperation with evil is as much a moral obligation as is cooperation with
good. No other person has been more eloquent and passionate in getting this idea across than
Henry David Thoreau.”). King also advocated illegal conduct. He famously told reporters: “If a
law is unjust . . . we have a moral responsibility to disobey the unjust law.” RAYMOND
ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 302 (2006)
(quotation marks omitted) (discussing Dr. King’s account to reporters after Birmingham,
Alabama Circuit Judge Francis Thompson ruled that a Freedom Rider was guilty of inciting a
breach of the peace and sentenced him to six months in jail while another judge enjoined civil
rights workers from conducting “freedom rides,” in which they would ride buses and break
segregation laws). On numerous other occasions King argued for direct action. See MARTIN
LUTHER KING JR., LETTER FROM THE BIRMINGHAM JAIL 7 (HarperSanFrancisco 1994) (1963)
[hereinafter Letter from the Birmingham Jail] (“[T]he purpose of the direct action is to create a
situation so crisis-packed that it will inevitably open the door to negotiation.”).
142
See Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 141 (noting that virtual sit-ins are illegal); see also Konstantin
Beznosov & Olga Beznosova, On the Imbalance of the Security Problem Space and Its
Expected Consequences, 15 INFO. MGMT. & COMPUTER SEC. 420, 425–26 (2007) (discussing
the increasing use and effectiveness of virtual sit-ins).
143
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002) (treating internet
virtual pornography as speech despite its use of a new medium and refusing to rely on a
secondary effects test); United States v. White, No. 7:08-CR-00054, 2010 WL 438088, at *13–
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b. True Threats
In addition to incitement, the Fullmer court relied on the “true
threats” doctrine to reach the conclusion that the content of SHAC’s
website was not protected by the First Amendment.144 The court
premised its holding that the content of SHAC's website was a “true
threat” on three separate determinations: (1) publicizing personally
identifiable information is not protected by the First Amendment;
(2) historical context can be used in analyzing whether speech is a
“true threat;” and (3) the subjective knowledge of the listener can be
used to determine whether the listener was reasonable in regarding
public speech as a “true threat.”145 Each of these determinations runs
against Supreme Court precedent and is a sizeable shift from
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence.146
c. Public Speech and the Internet
The court held that while SHAC’s advocacy was protected by the
First Amendment, its “speeches, protests, and web postings” were not
because they were “true threats.”147 Like inciting speech, “true
threats” are a class of speech not protected by the First
Amendment.148 The Supreme Court has stated that three principle
reasons for not protecting “true threats” are (1) to protect individuals
14 (W.D. Va. Feb. 4, 2010) (applying traditional Brandenburg test to the internet and email).
144
See Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 155–56 (noting that the content of the website was not
protected because it furthered SHAC’s advocacy, which included criminal conduct, even though
the advocacy itself was protected).
145
Id. at 155–57 (relying on a researcher’s subjective awareness of an assault on a
researcher in England in 2001 to determine whether a researcher’s subjective belief that he was
in danger was reasonable).
146
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909–10 (1982) (holding that
publicizing personally identifiable information is protected by the First Amendment); Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that the context of the
particular utterance is important regarding the determination of a threat); Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (holding that there must be a showing of intent to intimidate on the
part of the speaker).
147
Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 156 (noting that the content was not protected because it furthered
SHAC’s efforts).
148
See Watts, 394 U.S. at 707. Watts, an eighteen-year-old anti-war advocate, announced
during a public protest of the Vietnam War that if he were drafted and given a gun, “the first
man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” Id. at 706. Although the Court held that Watts had not
made a threat against the President but, rather, was speaking in “political hyperbole,” id at 708,
it stated in dicta that the federal statute criminalizing threats against the President was valid. Id.
at 707. It is well established amongst scholars that this was the beginning of the true threats
exception. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First
Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337, 1338 n. 4 (2006) (noting that with the Court’s
statement that the statute was valid the threats exception was born).
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from fear of violence, (2) to protect against disruption caused by the
threat, and (3) to allow law enforcement to intervene and incarcerate
people likely to carry out those threats.149 Unlike incitement,
however, courts have traditionally applied the “true threats” doctrine
only to private communications.150 The rationale driving this public
versus private distinction is twofold. First, one-on-one
communications often intend to convey the literal meaning of the
stated words while public speech is often rhetorical or “political
hyperbole.”151 Second, threats made in one-on-one communications
are likely to be heard only by the actual recipient of the threat.152
Thus, they contribute little, if anything, to the overall marketplace of
ideas, and their suppression does not offend the notion that the First
Amendment promotes truth through unfettered access to
information.153
The Supreme Court has gone to considerable lengths to distinguish
public from private communications in analyzing whether some
speech is a “true threat.”154 The Supreme Court’s holdings explicitly
state that speech that may be considered a “true threat” when uttered
in a one-on-one communication will not be considered a “true threat”
when made in public debate.155 The Supreme Court has articulated
this point in each of its “true threat” decisions.
149
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (providing a list of reasons for
removing true threats from First Amendment protection); see also Jennifer E. Rothman,
Freedom of Speech and True Threats, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 290–92 (2002) (adding
an additional reason why “true threats” are not protected by the First Amendment, “to prevent
people from being coerced into acting against their will”).
150
See Rothman, supra note 149, at 336 (“All courts agree that a direct threat, which is not
said as rhetorical hyperbole or in jest and is not a highly conditional statement, is unprotected.”).
151
See id. at 337 (noting that no reasonable listener would interpret a direct threat made in
jest); see also Watts, 394 U.S. at 708 (holding that a Vietnam War protestors proclamation that
if drafted he would shoot President Johnson was not a “true threat” but mere hyperbole).
152
See Karst, supra note 148, at 1390 (noting that threats are typically worthless at
informing the decision making abilities of the public because, except in unusual circumstances,
they will never hear of these communications).
153
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (per curiam); id. (noting that faceto-face threats are outside the scope of the First Amendment).
154
See Watts, 394 U.S. at 706 (holding that a Vietnam War protestor’s proclamation that if
drafted he would shoot President Johnson was not a “true threat” but mere hyperbole given its
public nature); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 446 n.1 (1969) (per curiam) (finding that a
Ku Klux Klan leader’s chanting “bury the Nigger” and suggestion of “revengeance” against the
Supreme Court, Congress, and the President was protected by the First Amendment because it
was a public speech); see also Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American
Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(noting in a one paragraph dissent that where speech is public, it deserves the full protection of
the First Amendment, and for that reason alone he would dissent from the majority’s opinion,
which found activists liable for threatening physicians over the internet).
155
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902–06 (1982) (claim by leader
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In Watts v. United States,156 the Court was confronted with the
question of whether an eighteen-year-old anti-war demonstrator’s
statement to a crowd of fellow protestors that if the government gave
him a gun he would shoot President Johnson first, amounted to a
threat against the President.157 The Court held that the statement was
not a “true threat” but was mere “political hyperbole.”158 The Court’s
holding that Watts’ made his statement in jest was based on an
assumption that public debates or rallies, as opposed to private
speech, are not the type of venues where the literal meaning of words
should be attributed to speech.159
Similarly, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,160 the Court
reviewed numerous statements and actions made during boycotts of
white-owned businesses in Claiborne County, Mississippi.161 Charles
Evers, an NAACP organizer, who had already announced that blacks
who violated the boycott “would be watched” and “warned that the
Sheriff could not sleep with boycott violators at night,” declared
during a rally that “[i]f we catch any of you going in any of them
racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck.”162 The Court
indicated that had this speech been privately communicated it may
not have been protected, but ultimately held that it was, although
threatening, not a “true threat.”163 The Court stated that Evers’ speech
is the kind of rousing, spontaneous speech necessary for advocacy
and protected by the First Amendment.164 In its most recent “true
threats” analysis, Virginia v. Black,165 the Court again relied on this
public-private distinction.166 The Court distinguished the act of
of civil rights boycott in segregated South that “[i]f we catch any of you going in any of them
racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck” was constitutionally protected); Watts, 394
U.S. at 706 (finding that statement to a third party was not a “true threat”); see also Rothman,
supra note 149, at 299–301 (arguing that in both Watts and Claiborne the audience was not
threatened, but rather a warning or threat was made against a third-party, which looks more like
political hyperbole than a threat against a specific person, even if a specific person has been
implicated in the threat).
156
394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
157
Id. at 705.
158
Id. at 708.
159
See id at 707–708. (much of the Court’s finding that the statement was in jest was
because it was aimed at an audience other than the person being threatened and the crowd
reacted with laughter to Watts’ speech).
160
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
161
Id. at 888.
162
Id. at 900 n.28, 902.
163
See id. at 907–12 (“[T]he boycott clearly involved constitutionally protected activity.”).
164
Id. at 911–12.
165
538 U.S. 343 (2003).
166
Id. at 344.
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burning a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally, which it noted is protected by
the First Amendment, from the act of burning a cross in a person’s
yard without consent, which it held could be considered a “true
threat.”167 There is an utter lack of Supreme Court precedent
supporting the conclusion that public speech, absent a showing of
incitement, is a “true threat.”168
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on a case of “true
threats” involving the Internet, courts and commentators generally
agree that it poses no new, significant problems simply because it is a
different medium of expression and therefore, courts should analyze it
using the traditional public-private distinction.169 The most discussed
case dealing with “true threats” over the Internet is Planned
Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of
Life Activists.170 In Planned Parenthood, anti-abortion advocates
posted the names of physicians and other clinicians known to perform
abortions on “wanted posters,” which were displayed on a webpage
entitled the “Nuremberg Files.”171 When a physician was murdered
his name was crossed out; when a physician was wounded his name
was grayed out.172 On three consecutive occasions, doctors were
murdered shortly after their names were posted on the webpage.173
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
website could be found civilly liable for posting the names of
additional doctors because a “reasonable person would foresee that
the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker
communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to

167
See id. at 365–66 (plurality opinion) (differentiating between “cross burning directed at
an individual [and] cross burning directed at a group of like-minded believers”). A plurality of
justices upheld a statute proscribing the burning of a cross with the intent to intimidate, though it
struck down a provision mandating that cross burning be considered prima facie evidence of
that intent. The plurality noted that a public cross burning was protected speech when it was
intended to express the ideology of the Ku Klux Klan. Id.
168
See supra notes 154–67 and accompanying text.
169
See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that
“threats are tools that are employed when one wishes to have some effect, or achieve some goal,
through intimidation,” and can potentially be made through email); see also Rothman, supra
note 149, at 331 (noting that there is nothing unique about internet communications that
removes them from the traditional public-private distinction).
170
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
171
Id. at 1062–66 (four physicians and two health centers brought suit under the Freedom
of Access to Clinics Entrances Act, which prohibits threats against a person because that person
has engaged in reproductive health services).
172
Id. at 1065.
173
See id. at 1085 (despite the apparent connection between the posters and the murders
the case was decided by a closely divided 6-5 court).
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harm.”174 Commentators have been highly critical of the decision
because of its tendency to blur the public-private speech distinction,
and courts have resisted applying Planned Parenthood’s reasoning
beyond the unique facts addressed in the case, which were multiple
murders immediately following the posting of personally identifiable
information.175
d. Personally Identifiable Information Is Not Protected Speech
The court stated that publicizing personally identifiable
information including names, telephone numbers, and home addresses
is beyond First Amendment protection.176 Contrary to the court’s
holding, however, courts have consistently been protected the
publicizing of personally identifiable information, in both newspapers
and on the Internet.177 Not only is the publication of personally
identifiable information protected by the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court has stated that such speech, though “offensive” and
“coercive” serves the protected function of persuading others to join
your cause “through social pressure and the ‘threat’ of social
174

Id. at 1074 (quoting United States v. Orozco–Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.

1990)).
175
See United States v. Lincoln, 403 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2005) (refusing to extend to
Planned Parenthood to a case of threats against the President); United States v. White, 638 F.
Supp. 2d 935, 948–49 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (limiting the application of Planned Parenthood to
multiple murders following dissemination of “wanted” posters); United States v. Carmichael,
326 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1284 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (refusing to extend Planned Parenthood beyond
context of several murders soon after the postings were made); Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F.
Supp. 2d 1135, 1140–42 (W.D. Wash 2003) (holding that Planned Parenthood could not be
extended to the more general situation where personally identifiable information is posted on the
Internet with the intent of intimidating the person, but is limited to the specific facts addressed
in the case).
176
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009) (classifying the conduct
at issue as “news”-like postings taken from anonymous sources and finding the dissemination of
“the personal information of individuals employed by Huntingdon and affiliated companies . . .
more problematic”).
177
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (evaluating numerous
statements and actions made during boycotts of white-owned businesses in Claiborne County,
Mississippi). The Court held that reading the names of boycott violators aloud at a public
meeting and publishing their names in newspapers are speech in its most direct form and are
protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 909–10. Lower courts have also held that personally
identifiable information is protected by the First Amendment, even where it puts the identified
individual at risk of physical harm. See Carmichael, 326 F. Supp. 2d at 1280–89 (holding that
the posting of information, names and personal addresses, of a number of government
informants and agents was protected by the First Amendment and not a “true threat”); Gregoire,
272 F. Supp. 2d at 1145–46 (refusing to issue an injunction to remove personally revealing
information about law enforcement officers on a website because the information was protected
by the First Amendment and holding that the posting of that information, even if it was intended
to intimidate the officers, is protected as a matter of law).
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ostracism.”178 Publicizing personally identifiable information is
fundamental to having a voice in the political process because
identifying which individuals are associated with what group allows
the audience to determine with whom to associate or whom to
ostracize.179
In Claiborne Hardware, the boycott organizers placed watchers
outside of stores in order to identify the individuals that were
breaking the boycott.180 The names of those individuals were then
published in a newspaper and read aloud during NAACP meetings. 181
This all occurred against the backdrop of Charles Evers’ statements
that any individual caught breaking the boycott would have his neck
broken,182 and the Court held that publicizing the names was
protected speech because it served the legitimate purpose of
furthering the boycott.183
Similar to Claiborne Hardware, SHAC posted the personally
identifiable information of Huntingdon Life Science executives and
the executives of companies that transacted with Huntingdon so that
activists could protest those specific individuals.184 Once posted,
SHAC members were able to identify the source of their opposition
and protest accordingly, which is exactly the rationale that the
Fullmer court identified.185 Rather than protecting this information,
the Fullmer court, without citing any authority for its determination,
broadly held that the First Amendment does not protect publicizing
personally identifiable information.186
e. Historical Context of Speech
In Planned Parenthood, the court relied on the historical context of
SHAC’s speech in determining that it was a “true threat.”187 Context
178

Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S at 909–12.
See Volokh, supra note 99, at 1114-15 (arguing that publicizing names and addresses
fosters participation in public debate and provides otherwise unavailable information about who
to boycott and ostracize, hallmarks of civil disobedience).
180
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 903–04, 929 n.72.
181
Id. at 903–04.
182
See id. at 902 (stating that blacks who traded with white merchants were traitors who
would be disciplined and have their necks broken).
183
Id. at 909–10.
184
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155 (3d Cir. 2009).
185
See id. at 142–46 (noting that some individuals were picketed after their information
was published).
186
Id. at 155.
187
See id. at 138–46 (describing past acts of violence that took place all across the United
States and in Europe).
179
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is critical to a “true threat” analysis.188 In fact, it is often outcome
determinative.189 Traditionally, however, courts have limited
considerations of context to the circumstances immediately
surrounding the utterance itself and have refused to consider the
speaker’s past communications190 or current affiliations.191 For
example, in evaluating whether the act of burning a cross, perhaps the
single most threatening symbol in American history, is a true threat,
the Supreme Court reviews only the context in which the cross
burning occurs, and not the history of violence associated with the Ku
Klux Klan.192 The Court limits its determination of context to the
events and circumstances surrounding the specific cross burning.193 It
is a question of whether the cross burning occurs on another’s
property without consent or at a public demonstration.194

188
See United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining a true threat
as “a statement, written or oral, [made] in a context or under such circumstances . . . [that
indicate] a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the
President”) (emphasis added).
189
See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (per curiam) (noting that
“[t]aken in context" the speaker’s words were merely political hyperbole, and this determination
was reinforced by the crowd’s laughter at his declaration of his intention to shoot the president);
Karst, supra note 148, at 1338 (noting that the key question in analyzing “true threats” is
“considered in its context, does this statement express a threat, or not?”).
190
See United States v. Lincoln, 403 F.3d 703, 707 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a
conversation in which a defendant told a law enforcement officer that he wanted to kill
President Bush could not be used to prove the context of a letter written to President Bush
stating that he would die when the conversation with the law enforcement officer occurred six
months before the letter was written). This has been so even where past speech is alarming and
particularly relevant to the consideration of the speaker’s intent. See United States v. Alkhabaz,
104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that email messages expressing violence against women
did not constitute a threat). Alkhabaz was arrested under a statute prohibiting threats when it
was determined that he had corresponded with an Internet pen pal about very specific desires
and plans to abduct, rape, torture, and kill a young girl or woman. Id. at 1498–1502 (Krupansky,
J., dissenting). The court held that no threat had been made and refused to read the emails under
a broader historical context, which included the defendant’s writing and posting a story on the
Internet that personally identified a classmate of his and described how he and an accomplice
would attack, abuse, rape, torture, kill, and set her on fire. Id.
191
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (plurality opinion) (finding that a
Virginia statute banning cross burnings impermissibly blurs the necessary contextual distinction
between cross burnings that act as “constitutionally proscribable intimidation” and cross
burnings that are “core political speech”). Justice Thomas argued that the Ku Klux Klan’s
history of violence should be considered in determining whether the act of burning a cross at a
white supremacy rally should be considered a “true threat.” Id. at 389 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
No other members of the Court accepted Justice Thomas’ view. Id. at 366.
192
See id. at 365–66 (noting that the provision in issue does not allow a court to
differentiate between a cross burning as core political speech and a cross burning done for the
purpose of threatening a victim).
193
Id.
194
See id. at 366–67.
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In Planned Parenthood, the Ninth Circuit expanded the analysis of
context in determining whether the “Nuremberg Files” was a true
threat, because it looked not only at the speech itself but the acts that
immediately followed the speech.195 Even this analysis, which was a
significant break from precedent, was narrowly tailored to the specific
postings of the “wanted posters” and the murders that immediately
followed them.196 The court held that because three postings were
immediately followed by murders, a fourth post could be construed as
a “true threat.”197 The court emphasized that this historical context
was limited to the posting and the murders that followed by
explaining that had the deaths not occurred, the postings would not
have constituted “true threats,” even if they “endorsed or encouraged
the violent actions of others, [their] speech would be protected.”198
Without explanation, the Fullmer court vastly expanded on the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.199 The court identified specific instances of
illegality, including property damage that was not attributed to SHAC
and one assault that occurred in England two years prior to the SHAC
arrests, and used these incidents to frame the content of the SHAC
website as a “true threat.”200
f. Intent to Threaten
It has long been suggested that an objective test reduces First
Amendment protection by creating a negligence standard whereby the
speaker must regulate his speech according to the anticipated
response of a reasonable listener.201 Objective standards can cause
195
Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coal. Of Life Activists,
290 F.3d 1058, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002).
196
See id (holding that the posters were a true threat even though they connote something
they do not specifically say).
197
See id. (concluding that the posters were a true threat because, while the posters did not
literally threaten, they implied a message that both the actor and recipient understood).
198
Id. at 1072. The Sixth Circuit took a similar approach in an earlier decision, holding
that a series of emails describing a sexual desire to commit violent acts against women
following the online publication of a story discussing the rape, torture, and murder of the
author’s identified classmate was not a “true threat.” United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492,
1495 (6th Cir. 1997).
199
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 155–57 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding that some
of the speech on the SHAC’s website was not protected by the First Amendment when viewed
in context and that defendants who created or disseminated the speech were also not protected
by the First Amendment).
200
See id. at 138–43 (identifying an assault in England in 2001 and a number of acts of
property destruction that occurred throughout the United States).
201
See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(arguing that the reasonable listener and speaker tests place the protection of speech in the hands
of a reasonable audience and have the effect of chilling speech by forcing speakers to steer clear
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speech to be punished as a threat where the speaker had no intention
to threaten.202 The circuit courts traditionally split with respect to
whether the speaker must intend his speech as a threat or whether it is
sufficient to show that a reasonable listener or reasonable speaker
would perceive the speech as a threat.203 In Virginia v. Black, the
Supreme Court provided some guidance about the scienter
requirement.204 The Court held that there must be a showing of intent
to intimidate before speech loses its First Amendment protection
under the “true threat” doctrine.205 Commentators have generally
agreed that after Black, “true threats” only apply when the speaker
has intended to threaten.206 Acknowledging the Supreme Court’s
decision in Black, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the Planned
Parenthood holding in United States v. Cassel,207 where it held that to
prove that speech is a “true threat” in a criminal proceeding, the
of controversial speech that the audience could potentially consider a threat but where the
speech itself is not threatening).
202
See Rothman, supra note 149, at 314–16 (noting that both the reasonable speaker and
listener tests result in ambiguous language being construed as a threat and punished where the
speaker had no intent to threaten and his only intent was to use his speech as a rhetorical
device).
203
Id. at 302 (noting that the Second Circuit has traditionally taken the strongest stance
with respect to mandating that there be an intent to threaten while the other circuits have
adopted some variation of an objective standard).
204
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003) (“‘True threats’ encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals. The speaker need
not actually intend to carry out the threat.” (citation omitted)).
205
Id. (noting that some cross burnings indisputably constitute a true threat because “the
history of cross burning . . . shows that [it] is often intimidating, intended to create a pervasive
fear in victims that they are a target of violence.”).
206
See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, A Few Questions About Cross Burning, Intimidation, and
Free Speech, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1294 (2005) (accepting that the decision mandates
an intent requirement but criticizing the court’s simultaneous extension of a threat exception to
an “intimidating” symbol while recognizing the protected status of the same symbol as
“political” speech in a different context); Karst, supra note 148, at 1347–48 (arguing that
Black’s definition of “threat” requires a showing of intent); Frederick Schauer, Intentions,
Conventions, and the First Amendment: The Case of Cross-Burning, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 197,
218–24 (noting that Black assumes a specific intent to intimidate). Commentators argued that an
intent requirement was mandatory under the First Amendment prior to Black, as well. See
Stephen G. Gey, The Nuremberg Files and the First Amendment Value of Threats, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 541, 546–53 (2000) (arguing that political advocacy is at the heart of the First Amendment
and the only way to protect this is by limiting the threat exception to those cases that fall within
the Brandenburg doctrine for incitement to unlawful action, which requires, in part, intent that a
threat be acted upon); Rothman, supra note 149, at 316–17 (arguing that an objective test leads
to a chilling of speech because of the ambiguity created when First Amendment protection is
placed in the hands of the listener).
207
408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005). Cassel was convicted of interfering with the sale of
federal land when he threatened to burn down any house built on federal property near his
home. Id. at 625.
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prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant subjectively
intended the speech as a threat.208 Under the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Black and the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cassel, the determination
of whether some statement or action is a “true threat” is a question of
whether the speaker intends to intimidate.209 The Fullmer court
ignored this approach.210
The Fullmer court relied on a reasonable listener standard, but also
considered the subjective knowledge of the listener to determine
whether the speech was a “true threat,” which is especially dangerous
given the court’s framing of SHAC’s speech within an expansive
context.211 As the court noted, the primary use of the website was as
an organizing tool for group members.212 SHAC used the website to
coordinate group activities and allow communication between
activists.213 There is no suggestion in the court’s analysis that SHAC
ever intended Huntingdon Life Science executives or individuals
other than its own members to view the content of the website, and,
thus, there is no indication that it was intended to intimidate or
threaten those individuals.214 Where the speaker never intended to
communicate the speech to the end listener, there is no threat. Courts
have enforced this principle even under a reasonable listener standard
where the speech at issue is especially egregious and frightening.215
208

Id. at 633.
See Black, 538 U.S. at 359–60 (finding that a true threat requires an intent to intimidate,
but that the speaker need not intend to carry out the threat); Cassel, 408 F.3d at 631–33 (holding
that in a criminal case the government must prove a subjective intent to threaten before speech
can be removed from First Amendment protection).
210
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 157 (3d Cir. 2009) (ruling that one of the
individuals discussed on the website was reasonable in believing that he was threatened because
of his awareness, among other incidents, of a previous assault that occurred in England years
earlier).
211
The court does not expressly adopt a standard, but its analysis and reasoning indicate
that it adopted a reasonable listener standard. See id. at 154 (noting that in determining whether
a statement constitutes a true threat, a court should consider the totality of the circumstances
including the reaction of the listener).
212
Id. at 139.
213
See id. (noting that the SHAC members used the website to coordinate future protests
and publish information about past protests).
214
See id. (discussing the contents of the website in general without reference to external
viewers).
215
See United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1495–1502 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that
email messages in question did not constitute a true threat because the emails were not being
conveyed as intimidation). After the defendant was discovered to have personally identified a
classmate by name and address in a story he posted on the Internet (in which he and another
male kidnapped, raped, and tortured her through very specific sadistic acts before killing her and
setting her on fire), the FBI investigated and discovered emails exchanged between the
defendant and another male discussing plans to commit similar acts against a woman. The
emails also discussed whether the female victim would be one of the defendant’s classmates.
209
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The Fullmer decision turned not on a question of intent but on the
expectation of the audience in light of the historical context of the
speech, which includes the audience’s subjective awareness of past
acts of violence caused by individuals unrelated to the speaker and
even where the speech may not have been intended for the listener.216
Under the ruling in Fullmer, individuals with the same intent and who
speak identical words will be afforded different constitutional
protection based purely on the way the audience perceives the
speaker.217
The court’s decision poses grave consequences for speakers of
minority views who may inappropriately be feared by members of the
majority. By focusing on specific instances of violence associated
with the speaker and the subjective response of the audience, the
speaker is faced with the impossible task of determining how all
listeners will react.218 Prior to the Fuller decision, however, the
listener was only reasonable in perceiving the speech as a threat if the
specific context in which the speech was uttered indicated the
presence of a threat.219 Under Fullmer, the listener may reasonable
simply because the group to which the speaker belongs is associated
with illegal acts, even if those acts occurred years earlier, in different
locations, and were credited to different organizations.220 In addition
The court held that the emails could not be considered a true threat because there was no intent
that the female classmate identified in the online story ever read them. Id.
216
See Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 157 (discussing awareness of previous attacks).
217
See id. (stating that even if the speech possessed political value, it was not protected
because the third-party listener was “keenly aware” of the organization’s previous actions, and,
thus, the fear was reasonable).
218
See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 43–44 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(“[T]he jury was permitted to convict on a showing merely that a reasonable man in petitioner’s
place would have foreseen that the statements he made [threatening the President’s life] would
be understood as indicating a serious intention to commit the act.”).
In essence, the objective interpretation embodies a negligence standard, charging the
defendant with responsibility for the effect of his statements on his listeners. . . .
[W]e should be particularly wary of adopting such a standard for a statute that
regulates pure speech . . . [because it] would have substantial costs in discouraging
the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate that the First Amendment is intended
to protect.
Id. at 47–48 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
219
See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705–07 (1969) (per curiam) (limiting
the discussion of context to the utterance itself).
220
See Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 156 (relying on several acts of property damage that were
committed throughout the United States over the course of several years for which the Animal
Liberation Front and not SHAC took credit and the assault of a researcher that took place in
England in 2001).
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to regulating whether the context of the speech itself will be regarded
as a “true threat,” the speaker must determine how listeners will react
in light of her association with a specific group and that group's
actions over an unidentified span of time and in a wide range of
locations.221
This is likely to have a chilling effect on speakers of controversial
social movements because at some level all social movements are
associated with instances of past violence and are suggestive of future
violence.222 In 1963, while imprisoned in a Birmingham, Alabama
jail, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. stated that if blacks in Birmingham
were prohibited from civil disobedience, violence would erupt.223 The
civil rights movement was linked to violence in many demonstrable
ways.224 If read against a broad historical backdrop, a person with
subjective knowledge of these past criminal acts, including civil
disobedience and race riots, could reasonably construe Dr. King's
message as a threat.225 The Fullmer court’s decision to consider the
historical context of speech under a reasonable listener standard
places a heavy burden on a speaker to anticipate not only the
emotional toll her speech will have on a reasonable listener, but also
the emotional toll her speech will have on a reasonable listener in
light of the listener’s subjective knowledge of the speaker and her
affiliations. It is only after making these determinations that the
activist is assured constitutional protection. Placing such a heavy
burden on the speaker has the potential to end the rousing and
spontaneous speech that is necessary for activism and protected by
221
Id. at 157 (noting that this reasonableness determination was built upon the subjective
knowledge of the listener, who was aware of specific events that although were not caused by
the speaker were enough to implicate his speech as a threat).
222
See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
223
See Letter from the Birmingham Jail, supra note 141.
224
See THOMAS ADAMS UPCHURCH, RACE RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1960–1980
33 (Ronald H. Bayor ed., 2008) (discussing the rise of the “Black Power” movement, the
violence that surrounded it, and the media attention that it received in the early 1960s); Susan
Olzak & Suzanne Shanahan, Deprivation and Race Riots: An Extension of Spilerman’s
Analysis, 74 SOC. FORCES 931, 938 (1996) (noting that while there were few race riots before
1954, by 1961 race riots had occurred in many major metropolitan centers and by 1963 race
riots had occurred in Birmingham, Alabama); Hazel Erskine, The Polls: Demonstrations and
Race Riots, 31 PUB. OPINION Q. 655, 655 (1967) [hereinafter Polls: Race Riots] (in a 1944
nationwide poll 72% of respondents stated that they were aware of race riots between whites
and blacks); Hazel Gaudet Erskine, The Polls: Race Relations, 26 PUB. OPINION Q. 137, 137–39
(1962) (nationwide polls taken in 1962 evidenced that whites had a strong distrust of “Freedom
Riders” and other groups directly involved in the struggle for civil rights).
225
See Polls: Race Riots, supra note 224, at 655 (noting that the vast majority of
Americans were aware of violence caused by tension between blacks and whites nearly two
decades before King’s inspiring words).
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the First Amendment.226 These concerns are heightened by
amendments to AEPA that increase its scope and are intended to
place further controls on animal rights activists.227
III. THE ANIMAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM ACT
A. Expanding AEPA
The SHAC arrests occurred during a time of great national
insecurity. The FBI, the lead federal agency for investigating
suspected acts and threats of terrorism, was vigorously investigating
groups of dissent, often through the unprecedented power conferred
by the Patriot Act228 and, at times, through illegal means.229
226
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (noting that an
advocate must be free to speak with emotion and spontaneity and where excessive restrictions
are placed on the speaker to consider the actions of third parties this is lost).
227
See infra Part III.A.1.iii.
228
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56,
§ 106, 115 Stat. 272, 277–278 (2001) (amending 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) (2006) and adding
50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2006)).
229
See Childs v. Dekalb Cnty., 286 F. App’x 687, 694 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
constitutional rights of animal rights advocates who peacefully picketed and leafleted on a
public sidewalk were violated when an undercover Department of Homeland Security officer
secretly monitored, followed, and arrested the protestors in 2004). Freedom of Information Act
requests showed that police officers assigned to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force were
spying on activists in violation of previously settled lawsuits for similar privacy invasions.
Among the ‘spy files’ recovered were the names and license plate numbers of peaceful
demonstrators, a report on a filmmaker planning to make a documentary criticizing the FBI, and
intercepted emails of an animal rights organization’s plans to demonstrate. See Ford Fessenden
& Michael Moss, Going Electronic, Denver Reveals Long-Term Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2002, at A12 (revealing that Denver Police had actually been spying on activists since the
1950s); ACLU, The Denver Police Spy Files, http://aclu-co.org/our-work/litigation-legaladvocacy/denver-police-spy-files. As part of a 2005 lawsuit challenging FBI surveillance, more
than 100 pages of heavily censored FBI files were released to the ACLU. The documents
showed that while no crimes had been discovered by the surveillance, the FBI used secret
informants to track and infiltrate the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals for years. All
told, the FBI released 2,357 pages of files on the ACLU, Greenpeace, the American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Treaty, and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals. Spencer S. Hsu, FBI
Papers Show Terror Inquiries Into PETA; Other Groups Tracked, WASH. POST., Dec. 20, 2005,
at A11; see also David Cole, Misdirected Snooping Doesn’t Stop Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 4,
2002, at A19 (arguing that the passage of the Patriot Act allowed the government to engage in
unpatriotic activity); Lisa Rein & Josh White, Maryland State Police Surveillance More
Extensive than Previously Acknowledged, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2009, at A1 (reporting that in
2008 it was revealed that until late 2007 police officers in Maryland were infiltrating animalrights groups and monitoring members); Bob Drogin, Spying on Pacifists, Greens and Nuns,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at A18 (reporting that between 2005 and 2007 an undercover agent
who went by the name “Lucy” monitored the activities of numerous peace groups including
animal rights, and despite the fact that Maryland State Police acknowledge that throughout this
time no criminal acts were identified the names of at least 53 people were placed in a terrorist
database that was shared with law enforcement agencies).
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Organizations from the far left to the extreme right were for the first
time labeled terrorist organizations.230 Freedom of Information Act231
requests for information is presumptively disclosable under the
Freedom of Information Act were denied with increased frequency as
the longstanding position of disclosure was replaced by policy
instructions to deny requests.232 As a result of these policy changes,
activists detained because of their placement on terrorist “watch lists”
were denied explanation, even when they were not currently under
criminal investigation.233
It was against this backdrop that the FBI argued that SHAC was an
example of animal rights terrorism that posed a threat to the security
of all Americans.234 The FBI openly acknowledged that the American
230
See Animal Rights: Activism vs. Criminality: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
108th Cong. 67 (2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) [hereinafter Animal Rights Hearing]
(arguing that the Bush administration was too eager to use the term terrorism for acts and
numerous organizations that did not merit it.). Senator Leahy said, “most Americans would not
consider the harassment of animal testing facilities to be ‘terrorism,’ any more than they would
consider anti-globalization protestors or anti-war protestors or women’s health activists to be
terrorists.” Id.
231
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
232
See David A. Anderson, Confidential Sources Reconsidered, 61 FLA. L. REV. 883, 895
(2009) (arguing that prior to the Bush administration there was a presumption in favor of
disclosing information). In a memorandum to all federal departments and agencies, Attorney
General John Ashcroft instructed federal department and agency heads that

[a]ny discretionary decision by your agency to disclose information protected under
the FOIA should be made only after full and deliberate consideration of the
institutional, commercial, and personal privacy interests that could be implicated by
disclosure of the information. . . . When you carefully consider FOIA requests and
decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, you can be assured that the
Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound legal basis
or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other agencies to
protect other important records.
Id. at 895 n.70 (quoting Department of Justice, Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft
on The Freedom of Information Act to Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies (Oct.
12, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/oip/foiapost/2001foiapost19.htm (last
visited Oct. 22, 2009)).
233
See Barnard v. Dep’t. of Homeland Sec., 531 F. Supp. 2d 131, 141 (D.D.C. 2008)
(holding that although petitioner was not currently under investigation, the Department of
Homeland Security properly invoked FOIA Exemption (7)(a), which is reserved for cases in
which the revelation of agency documents are expected to interfere with enforcement
proceedings). Neil Barnard, president of Physicians for Responsible Medicine, a physicians
committee that opposes animal testing was detained seventeen times between 2003 and 2007,
and on at least one occasion he read the words “Terrorist Organization Member: Caution” on an
airport computer screen. Id.
234
See Eco-Terrorism Specifically Examining the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal
Liberation Front: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 109th Cong. 11
(2005) [hereinafter Eco-Terrorism Hearing] (statement of John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Dir.,
Fed. Bureau of Investigation) (identifying SHAC as a domestic threat and a special interest
extremist movement along with ALF and ELF); see also Threat of Terrorism to the United
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animal rights movement had not caused the loss of a single human
life but nonetheless argued that “today’s most serious domestic
threats, coming from the special interest extremist movements [such
as] . . . Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty, commonly known as
(SHAC).”235 The FBI and the biomedical community argued that
AEPA’s scope was too limited to effectively combat this new breed
of animal rights terrorism.236 They advocated for legislation that was
capable of punishing not only acts that caused physical disruption of
an animal enterprise but also those that caused economic harms to
States: The Fed. Bureau of Investigation Hearings Before the United States S. Comms. on
Appropriations, Armed Servs., & Select Comm. on Intelligence, 108th Cong. (2001) (statement
of Louis J. Freeh, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation), available at http://www.fbi.gov/news/
testimony/threat-of-terrorism-to-the-united-states (providing an update on terrorist threats,
recent trends in terrorism, and the FBI’s counterterrorism strategy); Animal Rights Hearing,
supra note 230 (discussing the role and importance of animal and eco-terrorism).
235
Eco-Terrorism Hearing, supra note 234, at 11 (arguing for increased legislation
because although animal rights activists have not targeted human life, the FBI believes that this
could change).
The Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security agree that ecoterrorism is a severe problem, naming the [most] serious domestic terrorist threat in
the United States today as the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal
Liberation Front (ALF) which, by all accounts, is a converging movement with
similar ideologies [and] common personnel. . . . ELF and ALF [are] the No. 1
domestic terror concern over the likes of white supremacists, militias, and antiabortion groups. . . . Experts agree that although they have not killed anyone to date,
it is only a matter of time until someone dies as a result of ELF and ALF criminal
activity.
Id. at 1–3 (statement of Sen. James M. Inhofe); see also Southern Poverty Law Center,
Domestic Terrorism, Animal Activists Accused of Attempted Murder, 132 INTELLIGENCE
REPORT 5 (Winter 2008) (discussing non-governmental groups that monitor hate crimes and
terrorist activity have also concluded that animal rights organizations have not targeted
humans).
236
See Eco-Terrorism Hearing, supra note 234, at 39–40 (“One of our greatest challenges
has been the lack of Federal criminal statutes to address multi-state campaigns of
intimidation . . . . Therefore, the existing statutes may need refinements to make them more
applicable to current animal rights/eco-extremist actions and to give law enforcement more
effective means to bring criminals to justice.”). Proponents argued that AETA was necessary
because although the AEPA was an important tool for prosecutors, it was ultimately too limited
to stop combat the threat of terrorism. It was strongly urged that “SHAC and other animal rights
extremists have recognized limits . . . in the statute,” and that AETA did not offend the First
Amendment. Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 8 (2006)
(statement of Brent McIntosh, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy) [hereinafter
McIntosh Statement]. The Animal Enterprise Protection Coalition, a special interest group
founded and organized by the National Association of Biomedical Research, Lobbied for an
expansion to AEPA. “NABR created the Animal Enterprise Protection Coalition (AEPC) to
engage the biomedical research community into a much-needed grassroots campaign that
underscored the public support for the legislation.” National Association for Biomedical
Research, Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA), available at http://www.nabr.org/
Animal_Activism/Animal_Enterprise_Terrorism_Act.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
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individuals with a secondary or tertiary relationship to an animal
enterprise or caused emotional harm to a person.237 In response,
Congress enacted the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (“AETA”).238
AETA expanded AEPA in four important ways. First, it replaced
the phrase “causing physical disruption” with the broader phrase
“damaging or interfering.”239 Second, it increased the number of
entities whose property was protected under AETA to include, in
addition to animal enterprises, “any real or personal property of a
person or entity having a connection to, relationship with, or
transactions with an animal enterprise.”240 Third, it created an
independent source of liability for an interference that “places a
person in reasonable fear of . . . death . . . or serious bodily injury,”
but it did not include a requirement that such a person have any
connection to an animal enterprise.241 Fourth, it created an
independent source of liability for any individual who “conspires or
attempts” to interfere with an animal enterprise.242 In addition, AETA
retained the broad definition of an animal enterprise as any
(A) commercial or academic enterprise that uses or sells
animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber production,
agriculture, education, research, or testing;
(B) a zoo, aquarium, animal shelter, pet store, breeder,
furrier, circus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive animal
event; or
(C) any fair or similar event intended to advance
agricultural arts or sciences.243
The Department of Justice explicitly stated that AETA would not
be used to “prohibit or discourage the protected activities of
whistleblowers, protestors, and leafleters.”244 According to
proponents of AETA, traditional criminal laws were incapable of
preventing animal rights extremism because of the clandestine and
undetectable nature of the crimes committed by activists.245 Despite
237
See McIntosh Statement, supra note 236, at 8–9 (listing numerous ways SHAC has
terrorized animal enterprises with economic harm, and discussing the need for new legislation
tailored to criminalize such activity).
238
18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006).
239
Id. § 43(a)(1).
240
Id. § 43(a)(2)(A).
241
Id. § 43(a)(2)(B).
242
Id. § 43(a)(2)(C).
243
Id. § 43(d)(1)(A)–(C).
244
McIntosh Statement, supra note 236, at 10.
245
See Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. on
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these assurances, a coalition of AETA opponents voiced strong
criticisms that its effect would be a chilling of free speech.246
B. Constitutional Concerns for the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act
1. AETA Violates the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine
The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine enables litigants who
otherwise would not have standing to contest the constitutionality of a
statute to bring suit on the basis that the statute targets primarily
protected speech and is, thus, likely to cause individuals to refrain
from engaging in protected speech.247 The overbreadth doctrine is
grounded not in the individual right of the speaker to speak but in
what the public loses if the speaker is prevented from speaking. 248
“Many persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and
sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case
litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected speech,
harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is
deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”249 A court may not
Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 5 (2006)
(testimony of Brent McIntosh, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Policy) [hereinafter
McIntosh Testimony] (arguing that although it was an effective start, AEPA was ultimately too
limited to effectively combat animal right terrorism because its scope was too limited).
246
Animal Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 23 (2006)
(statement of William Potter, Journalist) [hereinafter Potter Statement] (“This legislation . . .
will force Americans to decide if speaking up for animals is worth the risk of being labeled a
‘terrorist,’ either in the media or in the courtroom. That’s not a choice anyone should have to
make.”); see also 152 CONG. REC. 21,836 (2006) (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich)
[hereinafter Kucinich Statement] (stating that AETA’s language “paint[s] everyone with the
broad brush of terrorism who might have a legitimate objection to a type of research or
treatment of animals that is not humane. . . . This bill is written in such a way as to have a
chilling effect on the exercise of peoples’ first amendment rights.”); National Lawyer’s Guild,
National Lawyer’s Guild Opposes Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, (Oct. 30, 2006),
http://www.commondreams.org/news2006/1030-14.htm; (stating that the AETA will deter
lawful activities protected by the First Amendment); Equal Justice Alliance, Our Allies,
http://www.noaeta.org/allies.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2011) (providing a list of more than 250
organizations that oppose the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act including the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and the Equal Justice Alliance).
247
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (“Litigants . . . are permitted to
challenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a
judicial prediction or assumption that the statute’s very existence may cause others not before
the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.”) see also Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863 (1991) (noting the
overbreadth doctrine’s break from the traditional as-applied requirement).
248
See Coplan, supra note 94, at 449 (arguing that the potential loss to a deliberate
citizenry of what a speaker might say is the foundation on which the overbreadth principle lies).
249
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (citation omitted).
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apply a statute in its present form if it has the effect of prohibiting a
significant amount of constitutionally protected speech.250 It may be
applied upon a judicial narrowing of the statute such that its
application does not violate the Constitution. A statute is only struck
down in its entirety if no constitutionally permissible application is
available.251 Where both protected speech and vagueness are at issue,
however, the reviewing court must be especially scrutinizing in its
analysis. A statute may be found unconstitutional even where the
statute would neither be found overbroad nor void for vagueness if
each was examined independently because the constitutional infirmity
exists in the penal statute’s susceptibility to sweep too broadly and
deter protected speech, even where it has not criminalized it.252
AETA violates the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. In
addition to penalizing activity that is properly criminalized, AETA’s
plainly legitimate sweep proscribes a substantial amount of protected
speech. AETA uses expansive terms; yet, it fails to limit the scope of
these terms by reference to a definition. AETA restricts speech on the
basis of content and viewpoint. In addition, even if AETA is
considered a content-neutral restriction on speech, it does not fulfill a
legitimate governmental interest in the least restrictive manner.
a. AETA Reaches a Substantial Amount of
Constitutionally Protected Speech
i. "Interfere" Encompasses Expressive Conduct
Under an overbreadth analysis, the initial question is whether the
regulation in question “criminalizes a substantial amount of protected

250
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 397 (1992) (White, J., concurring)
(agreeing with the Court’s invalidation of the city’s Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, but
suggesting that the case “could easily be decided . . . by holding . . . that the . . . ordinance is
fatally overbroad”); Fallon, supra note 247, at 855 (describing the First Amendment’s
overbreadth doctrine as prophylactic in nature); Alfred Hill, The Puzzling First Amendment
Overbreadth Doctrine, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1064 (1997) (noting that upon a showing that
a law is overbroad it may not be applied in its present form because to do so would be to enforce
a constitutionally violative law).
251
See Hill, supra note 250, at 1067 (“It is a basic principle of constitutional adjudication
that a statute should not be held unconstitutional unless the court has first determined that the
statute cannot be saved by a validating construction.”).
252
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428–29, 433 (1963) (overturning a Virginia
statute prohibiting solicitation of legal services because of its potential to extend into the civil
rights movement and noting that First Amendment freedoms are “precious” and that “[t]he
threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions”).
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expressive activity.”253 AETA prohibits an individual from interfering
with an animal enterprise but does not define “interfere.”254 The plain
meaning of the term “interfere” reaches expressive conduct.255 In
United States v. Willfong,256 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit relied on the dictionary definition to conclude that
“[t]o ‘interfere’ is to ‘oppose, intervene, hinder, or prevent.’”257 The
legal dictionary definition of “interference” is equally encompassing.
Interference is defined as “[t]he act of meddling in another’s
affairs. . . . An obstruction or hindrance.”258 These common meanings
demonstrate AETA’s reach into expressive conduct. Picketing,
protesting, leafleting, and numerous other constitutionally protected
speech fit squarely within these definitions, but to criminalize these
modes of expression, regardless of the views they express, denies
individuals their right to speak and denies society the opportunity to
hear the views they may advance.259
The Supreme Court has stated that unless otherwise specified by
statute, terms like “interfere” plainly encompass the verbal as well as
the physical aspect of conduct.260 State and federal courts have held
that the term “interfere” naturally includes verbal interferences and
have overturned statutes under the overbreadth doctrine when the
statute failed to clearly limit the terms breadth by definition.261 In
253
United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1841 (2008) (noting that the first step in the
overbreadth analysis is to determine the statute’s sweep); Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118–
19 (2003) (stating that a law is overbroad if it prohibits a “‘substantial’ amount of protected free
speech, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep’” (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973))).
254
See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1), (d) (2006).
255
See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495–96
(1982) (finding that the village’s ordinance did not interfere with Flipside’s First Amendment
rights because it did not prohibit or regulate the sale of Flipside’s literature).
256
274 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 2001).
257
Id. at 1301 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 704 (3d College ed. 1998)).
258
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 888 (9th ed. 2009).
259
See The Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1298
(1993) (noting that it is now well settled that picketing, protesting, leafleting, some libelous
false statements, as well as burning flags, crosses, and effigies are protected forms of
communication). Some courts that have directly addressed whether animal rights activists have
a First Amendment right to picket and protest an animal enterprise have answered in the
affirmative. See, e.g., Childs v. DeKalb Cnty 286 F. App’x 687, 693–94 (11th Cir. 2008)
(holding that the constitutional right of freedom of assembly and association of animal rights
advocates were violated when they were arrested by members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force
for leafleting on a public sidewalk outside of a Honey Baked Ham store).
260
Cf. City of Hous. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 455 (1987) (rejecting as overbroad an ordinance
making it unlawful to “‘in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policemen in the
execution of his duty, or any person summoned to aid in making an arrest’” (quoting HOUS.,
TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 34-11(a) (1984))).
261
See. e.g., State v. Casey, 876 P.2d 138, 140–41 (Idaho 1994) (holding that a statute
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Dorman v. Satti,262 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit overturned the Connecticut Hunter Harassment Act,263 a
statute very similar in scope to AETA, on account of its overly broad
restriction on speech.264 The act prohibited an individual from
interfering with persons engaged in the lawful taking of wildlife.265
Like AETA, the statute did not define “interfere” and did not limit the
effect of the clause to any specific time, place, or manner.266 The
court held that because it failed to define the nature of the interference
it proscribed, it swept broadly into the zone of protected speech and
was therefore invalid under the overbreadth doctrine.267 AETA
proscribes interfering with specific entities but does not restrain its
reach by reference to a specific conduct or other definition.268 Other
courts have held that they are incapable of curing the statute’s
overbreadth even where the legislature has provided a definition of
interference as specific conduct and provided an exclusive list of
instances that are prohibited under the statute, because speech and
expression are inescapably intertwined with the term “interfere.”269
Therefore, as a threshold matter, AETA reaches the communicative
aspect of the conduct it prohibits.270
Where a statute’s plainly legitimate reach extends to a substantial
amount of protected speech “‘every reasonable construction must be
resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.’”271 A
making it a misdemeanor to enter or remain in an area with the intent to interfere with the lawful
taking or pursuit of wildlife was unconstitutionally overbroad); Opinion of the Justices, 509
A.2d 749, 752–53 (N.H. 1986) (at the request of the New Hampshire House of Representatives,
the Surpeme Court of New Hampshire issued an opinion that a statute prohibiting the
harassment of hunters, fishers, and trappers was constitutionally overbroad).
262
862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988).
263
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-183a (1985).
264
Dorman, 432 F.2d at 437. Like AETA, the Hunter Harassment Act prohibited with
interfering and did not provide a statutorily fixed meaning. See § 53a-183a (“No person shall:
(1) Interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person, or acts in preparation for such
taking, with intent to prevent such taking; or (2) harass another person who is engaged in the
lawful taking of wildlife or acts in preparation of such taking.”).
265
Id.
266
Id.
267
See Dorman, 862 F.2d at 437 (stating that the statute is not sufficiently tailored to avoid
criminalizing protected expression).
268
See 18 U.S.C § 43(d) (2006).
269
See State v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892, 897 (Conn. 1993) (stating that a statute articulating
specific triggering conduct does not escape First Amendment consideration because the conduct
itself, interference, is inescapably imbued with speech and expression).
270
See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (proscribing activity that “interfere[s] with the operations of an
animal enterprise”).
271
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 153 (2007) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)).
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saving construction can reel in an otherwise unconstitutionally broad
statute by interpreting and applying its terms in a constitutionally
acceptable manner.272 There are two significant obstacles to creating a
saving construction that reels “interfere” out of the realm of protected
speech, however. First, courts interpreting similar statutes have found
that “interfer[ence]” is inescapably intertwined with expressive
conduct such that the two are not readily distinguishable.273 Where the
term “interfere” is used without limitation by statute, courts have little
judicial authority to interpret it in a manner that is noticeably different
than the purpose for which it was enacted.274 Thus, “interfere” reaches
the verbal as well as the physical aspect of conduct.275
The second significant obstacle is related to the decision in
Fullmer. In light of Fullmer, it is apparent that pure speech can
violate AETA.276 The Fullmer court was interpreting AEPA, the reach
of which is substantially less than AETA, and the purpose behind
enacting AETA was to cast a broader net.277 In Fullmer, the Third
Circuit held that posting personally identifiable information and
advocating unlawful protests, including virtual sit-ins, violated
AEPA.278 The court did not indicate that its holding was limited to the
specific facts of the case. As a result, it could be applied to a broad
range of factual scenarios that involve the dissemination of personally
identifiable information or the advocacy of future illegal acts.279 The
272
See Hill, supra note 250, at 1067 (noting that it is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a
statute should not be invalidated unless the court has determined that there is no saving
construction).
273
See Ball, 627 A.2d at 896–97 (holding that even where the legislature has provided a
conduct specific definition, and provided an exclusive list of punishable actions, a statute that
proscribes interfering is overbroad because the term is inescapably imbued with speech).
274
See Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that “interfere” is such
an expansive term that to ask a court to define it would be to ask the court to perform the
legislature’s job); State v. Casey, 876 P.2d 138, 140–41 (Idaho 1994) (holding that a statute that
made it a misdemeanor to enter or remain in an area with the intent to interfere with the lawful
taking or pursuit of wildlife was unconstitutionally overbroad and could not limited by judicial
construction); Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d 749, 752–53 (N.H. 1986) (replying to a
certified question from the New Hampshire House of Representatives that a statute prohibiting
the harassment of hunters, fishers, and trappers was unconstitutionally overbroad and incapable
of being saved by judicial construction).
275
See City of Hous. v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 460–61 (1987) (noting that unless otherwise
limited by statute, the term “interfere” means verbal as well as physical interference).
276
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 154–56 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that speech
which invites imminent lawlessness, coupled with evidence that lawlessness is likely to occur, is
not protected by the First Amendment and may be found to violate the statute that regulates the
prospective lawlessness).
277
See discussion accompanying supra note 239–41.
278
Fullmer, 584 F.3d at 154–56.
279
See id.
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court blurred the lines between protected advocacy and “true threats”
or incitement to such a degree that it is difficult to draw a line
between the two, which creates another obstacle to formulating a
proper saving construction.280
ii. Loss of Real or Personal Property
An interference that “causes the loss of any real or personal
property . . . used by an animal enterprise, or any real or personal
property of a person or entity having a connection to, relationship
with, or transactions with an animal enterprise” satisfies the elements
of AETA.281 AETA does not define either “damage” or “personal
property.”282 Personal property is a broad classification, defined as
“[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and
not classified as real property.”283 Courts have frequently found that
personal property includes lost revenue284 and goodwill,285 as well as
ancillary business costs.286 Congress’s inclusion of the term personal
property and failure to include a limiting definition or other means by
which to guide the statute’s construction confers prosecutorial
discretion to enforce AETA against individuals who interfere with an
animal enterprise or entity related to an animal enterprise that results
in lost or profits or good will.287
280
See id. at 154–55 (stating that the content of SHAC’s website was not protected speech
because it furthered SHAC’s anti-Huntingdon Life Sciences campaign).
281
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(A) (2006).
282
See id. § 43(d).
283
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1337 (9th ed. 2009).
284
See Radiation Sterilizers, Inc. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 (E.D. Wash.
1994) (citing Backus v. Ft. Street Union Depot Co., 169 U.S. 557, 580 (1898) (“It is long
established . . . that a business’s property includes intangibles such as loss of profits and
goodwill.”); Martin v. Loula, 194 N.E. 178, 180 (Ind. 1935) (“It cannot be doubted that ‘debts,
earnings, salaries, wages, incomes from trust funds or profits’ are property . . . .”).
285
See Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 194
(1936) (“[G]ood will is property in a very real sense, injury to which, like injury to any
other species of property, is a proper subject of legislation.”); United States v. Baldinger,
838 F.2d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1988) (“It is beyond dispute that and well settled that ‘good
will’ is property of an intangible nature and the term ‘property’ includes ‘good will.’”);
Falstaff Beer, Inc. v. Comm’r, 322 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1963) (Wisdom, J.) (“Good will
is ‘property’ in the legal sense . . . .” (quoting J.L. Cooper & Co. v. Anchor Securities Co.,
113 P.2d 845, 849 (Wash. 1941))); Ford v. Ford, 782 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1989) (per curiam)
(treating goodwill as property in the context of a dissolution proceeding).
286
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 142 (9th Cir. 2009). The court indicated
that SHAC members intentionally damaged or attempted to cause the loss of property by
sending numerous emails that resulted in Huntington Life Science having to purchase upgraded
software equipment, and AEPA used language very similar to AETA. In addition, this could
also fall into the category of lost profits.
287
Expressive Conduct can interfere with a business by decreasing profits and business
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Often the very reason for protests, leafleting campaigns, speeches,
and other protected forms of advocacy is to direct negative attention
in a specific direction with the purpose of reducing that entity’s
revenue to such an extent that the targeted entity agrees to change its
policies or practices or to drive the entity from the market
altogether.288 Under AETA’s language, individuals could be punished
merely because their campaign is successful.289 This concern has not
been lost on critics. Congressman Steve Israel noted, “the bill fails to
define what ‘real or personal property’ means. As a result, legitimate
advocacy—such as a boycott, protest, or mail campaign—that causes
an animal enterprise to merely lose profits could be criminalized
under [the Act].”290 Recent newspaper and media reports have also
addressed these concerns and speculated about whether individual
protestors or individuals who come forward with incriminating
information about an animal enterprise that results in lost revenue will
be prosecuted under AETA.291 Even if prosecutions do not result from
such campaigns, the threat of prosecution is enough to cause
individuals to avoid politically motivated activity and drive debate on
these issues from the marketplace.292 Such concerns are at the very
heart of First Amendment protection.293
The broad definition of “animal enterprise” contributes to AETA’s
overbreadth. The definition of an animal enterprise includes entities
only tangentially related to the use of animals, including any facility
good will in a number of ways. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
909–12 (1982) (speech that accompanied boycott of white owned businesses interfered with
businesses by ostracizing individuals who attempted to shop at those stores).
288
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99 (1940) (holding that picketing is entitled to
First Amendment protection even where the intent of the picketers is to discourage patronizing
the store and ultimately to reduce the customer base and drive the store out of business
altogether).
289
See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(B) (2006).
290
152 CONG. REC. E2100 (Nov. 13, 2006) (statement of Steve Israel).
291
See Kim Severson, Upton Sinclair, Now Playing on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
2008, at F1 (noting that AETA could be used to prosecute an individual who on behalf of the
Humane Society videotaped the on goings of a slaughterhouse that led to the largest recall of
meat in American history); Seth Prince & Spencer Heinz, Activist Looks Beyond Fur Shop’s
Move, THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 30, 2006, at B2 (discussing whether AETA would be used to
prosecute protesters that forced a furrier to go out of business); Doug Erickson, Protecting
Researchers or Chilling Free Speech? Opponents and Animal Rights Activists Say the Law Goes
Too Far, but Advocates Say It Gives Needed Protection, WIS. STATE J., Nov. 26, 2006, at A1
(expressing concerns that AETA could be used to prosecute leafleting near a fur store because it
results in lost profits and discussing the impact that such concerns have on activism).
292
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (noting that the mere prospect of
prosecution and the prosecutions themselves are what make a statute constitutionally infirm).
293
See id. (overturning a Virginia statute prohibiting solicitation of legal services because
of its potential to create a fear of prosecution that would affect speech).
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that sells or uses animal products.294 There is no requirement that
these enterprises use or sell animal products in any specific amount or
degree.295 In addition to covering a remarkably broad body of
business enterprises, there is no requirement that the offender
interfere with these entities because of their use of animals or animal
products.296 Under the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep, a person
would be in violation of AETA for interfering with an automobile
manufacturer297 because it failed to disclose internal safety reports
about faulty engineering that put the public’s safety in jeopardy and
where such interference causes the manufacturer to lose $10,000 in
lost profits or consumer good will. Likewise, a person who interferes
with a clothing manufacturer’s298 plans to relocate to South America
violates AETA if that interference causes the loss of personal
property, including lost profits or customer good will, in excess of
$10,000. This invades upon a substantial amount of traditionally
protected advocacy, and the threat of prosecutions leaves open few
opportunities for debate on a host of issues.299
iii. Reasonable Fear Component
Interference that “intentionally places a person in reasonable fear”
satisfies the elements of AETA.300 This has the potential to create
criminal liability for the arousing and emotionally charged speech that
has traditionally been afforded protection under the First
Amendment.301 Emotionally charged speech and spontaneous rhetoric
can have profound emotional effects on listeners.302 Despite this
emotional toll, the Supreme Court has declared that advocates must
294

See 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(3)(A)–(B) (2006).
See id.
296
See id. § 43(a)(1) (requiring an intent to interfere but no motivational requirement as to
why they intended to interfere).
297
Under AETA’s broad definition of “animal enterprise,” automobile and other
manufacturers only minimally related to animals are animal enterprises because they use leather,
an animal product, in the design and manufacture of seats. See id. § 43(d)(1).
298
Under AETA’s definition of animal enterprise any clothing manufacturers that uses
wool, silk, leather, fur or other animal product is an animal enterprise. See id.
299
See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99 (1940) (holding that protestors have a First
Amendment right to picket even where the specific intent is to reduce profits to the company).
300
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(B).
301
See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (holding that the
threatening speech was warranted because it furthered the boycott against white-owned stores);
see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (per curiam) (noting the crowd’s
laughter as it reacted to Watts’ comment that he would kill President Johnson if drafted).
302
See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 928 (noting the effect on the audience of Evers’
claim that anyone who violated the boycott would have his neck broken).
295
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be free to stimulate their audiences through “spontaneous and
emotional appeals for unity and action.”303 The Supreme Court has
relied on
the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.304
AETA places this principle in jeopardy by placing the determination
of whether the elements of the offense have been met on the
emotional response of the listener.305
Heightening this risk is the fact that unlike the personal property
provision, AETA does not require that the person placed in fear have
any connection to an animal enterprise.306 The provision merely
requires that a person interfere with an animal enterprise and place a
person in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury.307 Two reasons
compel the conclusion that Congress intended this exclusion. First,
Congress specifically addressed a class of effected individuals
covered by the damage or loss of property subsection.308 Second,
Congress intended to substantially increase AEPA’s reach in
amending AETA.309 This reach is overinclusive, however, in that it
prohibits interfering speech that causes a person to fear death or
substantial bodily injury, even when no threats or incitement have
been made.310
Fuller exacerbated this concern by allowing the listener’s
subjective knowledge of past illegal acts to determine whether the
listener’s subjective response was reasonable in interpreting the
speech as a “true threat” and therefore not protected by the First
303

Id.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (reversing the conviction
of a Ku Klux Klan member who threatened “revengeance” for the suppression of the white
race).
305
See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(B) (requiring that the listener be placed in a position of fear).
306
See id. § 43(a)(1)(B).
307
Id.
308
See id. § 43(a)(2)(A); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“‘W]here
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim
Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972))).
309
See supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text.
310
See § 43(a)(2)(B).
304
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Amendment.311 The Fullmer court’s analysis is particularly relevant
because it was applying this reasoning to AEPA, AETA’s
predecessor.312 By grounding the determination of whether the
elements of the statute have been met in the reasonableness of the
listener’s response, the same concerns regarding historical context of
the speech as determinate of its constitutional protection that arose
under AEPA arise under AETA.313 Any person, either connected to an
animal enterprise or not, who is subjectively aware of past illegal acts
committed by activists may reasonably fear speech that endorses
violence or illegality by activists.314 On some level, researchers may
be reasonable in fearing animal rights activists because of the groups’
historically adversarial relationship.315 This alone, however, cannot
establish that expressive conduct is beyond First Amendment
protection.316 If such reasoning was applied to the First Amendment,
the Ku Klux Klan would have been silenced long ago, but the
Supreme Court has explicitly protected its speech.317 This charges
“the defendant with responsibility for the effect of his statements on
his listeners . . . . [Such a test] would have substantial costs in
discouraging the ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate that the
First Amendment is intended to protect.”318 This concern is enhanced
by the fact that, in addition to the intended recipient of the speech, it
311
United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 157 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that an employee’s
subjective fear that protestors would harm him was reasonable in light of his personal
knowledge that activists assaulted a researcher in England).
312
See id. at 137.
313
In Fullmer, the court based the determination of a reasonable threat in the listener’s
subjective knowledge of illegal acts committed by animal rights activists. See id. at 157.
Because AEPA is intended to cover a similar, albeit more extensive, amount of conduct and
because it is dealing with the same groups and their responses to one another it is likely that the
decision in Fullmer will have a substantial impact.
314
See id.
315
See discussion supra Part I.
316
Many groups have enjoyed adversarial and antagonistic relationships because of
religious differences or racial hatred, but the Supreme Court has stated that past relationship are
not enough to draw speech from First Amendment protection. This was most evident in a crossburning case in which only Justice Thomas held the view that the history of violence committed
by the Ku Klux Klan should be considered in the present context of the speech. See Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 389 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
317
See, e.g., id. at 359 (noting that burning a cross at a rally to promote the Ku Klux Klan
would be protected speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (holding that a
statute prohibiting speech that aroused anger or fear on the basis race, gender, religion, or creed
was a viewpoint-based discrimination and invalidating conviction under statute for burning a
cross); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (invalidating conviction of
Clarence Brandenburg, a KKK member, for threatening speech).
318
Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47–48 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
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applies to any individual who might hear and be emotionally affected
by the arousing speech.319
iv. Conspire or Attempt to Interfere
Conduct or speech that does not rise to the level of an actual
interference or cause fear or loss of property may still be criminal
under AETA’s conspiracy or attempt provision.320 This subsection
reaches pure speech, as is evidenced by both the decision in Fullmer
and more recently the arrests in United States v. Buddenberg.321 The
defendants in Buddenberg were charged with violating AETA for
allegedly attempting to enter a professor’s home during a protest,
which is not protected conduct, and conspiracy to violate AETA for
conduct traditionally protected speech,322 including protesting on
sidewalks outside of a private residence323 and distributing leaflets
319
See id. at 48 (arguing that with respect to speech and threats a narrow construction must
be applied in order to avoid the chilling of speech for fear of what the unanticipated response
might be).
320
See 18 U.S.C.§ 43(a)(2)(C) (2006).
321
See United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132 (3rd Cir. 2009) (the SHAC convictions were
based purely on their speech and were under the conspiracy provision of AEPA); United States
v. Buddenberg, No. CR-09-00263 RMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 100477, at *2–5 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
28, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion to dismiss indictment).
322
See Buddenberg, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 100477, at *2–5. The defendants were charged
under AETA for a series of incidents: (1) on October 21, 2007, twenty individuals protested in
front of a University of California Berkeley professor’s home; (2) on January 27, 2008, a group
of eleven demonstrators marched, chanted, and chalked comments on public sidewalks; (3) on
February 24, 2008, five to six individuals attempted to enter a professor’s home during his
child’s birthday party, and he claimed to have been hit by an object; and (4) on July 29, 2008, a
stack of leaflets identifying University of California researchers were left at a café. Federal
Bureau of Investigation Press Release, Feb. 20, 2009, “Four Extremists Arrested for Threats and
Violence against UC Researchers,” available at http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/119478.htm (last
accessed Feb. 28, 2011). The defendants were charged for conspiracy to violate AETA pursuant
to 18. U.S.C. section 371 but the court noted that there was no reason for this choice over
AETA’s own conspiracy provision. Buddenberg, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 100477 at *3 n.1. They
were charged with attempting and conspiring to violate AETA for leaving a stack of leaflets
containing personally identifiable information, chalking sidewalks, and focused picketing
outside of the researcher’s home. They were also charged with one count of AETA for the
alleged July 29 act. The charge did not indicate what provision of AETA it fell under, but the
court noted that it most likely fell under section (a)(2)(B), which prohibits causing fear of death
or bodily injury. Id. at *2–3. The court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment
on the mistaken belief that the defendants do not have standing to challenge a statute’s
overbreadth other than on an as applied basis. See id. at *5–12. The events are described in
detail in an FBI press release. See Federal Bureau of Investigation Press Release, supra. The
attempted entrance has less of an impact on speech and even many supporters of focused
picketing find such activity, although expressive, to be outside the protection of the First
Amendment. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 491–96 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
323
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488 (holding that picketing is protected in the absence of a
narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restriction); Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 551 (6th
Cir. 2004) (holding that in the absence of a narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restriction
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containing personally identifiable information.324 These incidents
occurred on different days over a several month period, and provide
some insight into AETA’s reach into the realm of traditionally
protected speech.325
b. AETA’s Restriction on Speech is Not Content-Neutral
“The right to free speech, of course, includes the right to attempt to
persuade others to change their views, and may not be curtailed
simply because the speaker’s message may be offensive to his
audience.”326 Content-neutral restrictions on speech, which regulate
matters such as whether residents can place signs in their lawns327 or
how loud speech can be,328 do not garner special constitutional
protection and are upheld so long as the statute in question reasonably
regulates the time, place, or manner of speech, irrespective of its
particular content.329 Where a regulation restricts speech or expressive
conduct on the basis of content or the speaker’s viewpoint, however,
there is a First Amendment right to engage in focused picketing in residential areas); City of
Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, 667 N.E.2d 942, 949 (Ohio 1996) (holding that a trial court
abuses its discretion when it enjoins residential picketing by groups with contrary views);
United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. State Emp’t Relations Bd., 710 N.E.2d 358,
364 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a statute that prohibited focused picketing outside of a
private residence violated the First Amendment).
324
See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983) (stating that as a general rule
leafleting and picketing “are expressive activities involving ‘speech’ protected by the First
Amendment”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909–10 (1982) (reading
aloud names of boycott violators at a public meeting and publishing their names in newspaper
are protected speech). Lower courts have also held that publishing personally identifiable
information is protected by the First Amendment. See United States v. Carmichael, 326 F. Supp.
2d 1267, 1280–89 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (addressing why posting the names and personal addresses
of government informants and agents did not satisfy the true threat doctrine and was protected
by the First Amendment); Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1145–46 (W.D. Wash.
2003) (refusing to issue an injunction to remove personally revealing information about law
enforcement officers on a website because the information was protected by the First
Amendment and holding that the posting of that information, even if it was intended to
intimidate the officers, is protected as a matter of law).
325
See Buddenberg, 2009 U.S. LEXIS 100477, at *2 (noting that the defendants engaged
in “a series of threatening demonstrations”).
326
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000).
327
See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 49 (1994) (holding that a city ordinance
prohibiting residents from placing signs in their yards was a content-neutral restriction because
it applied regardless of the message contained on the sign).
328
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) (holding that a prohibition
against objectionably loud speech is content-neutral because it restricts the volume of all speech,
whether it is rock music or a nursery rhyme).
329
See United States v. Hicks, 980 F.2d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1992) (ruling that a statute that
prohibited making threats to the crew of an airplane while in flight warranted only rational basis
review because it was a content-neutral regulation of time, place, and manner of speech and not
a regulation of content).
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the regulation must be narrowly tailored and support a compelling
governmental interest.330
i. AETA Restricts Speech on the Basis of the Speaker’s Viewpoint
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the
government from restricting speech where the rationale is based upon
the speaker’s viewpoint.331 While there are instances in which the
government may restrict the content of speech,332 the government
may not favor one viewpoint over another.333 The Supreme Court has
announced that viewpoint restrictions are per se unconstitutional and
the most egregious form of free speech deprivation.334 Viewpoint
discrimination occurs when the government allows expression on one
side of a debate but prohibits its opposing view.335 The prohibition on
viewpoint discrimination extends to what is often considered
abhorrent conduct, so long as it has some expressive quality,336 even
when the expressive conduct may be restricted on the basis of its
proscribable content without offending the First Amendment.337 The
330
See United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 626-–27 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying strict
scrutiny to a statute prohibiting interfering with a federal land sale because it has a contentbased element).
331
See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 391 (1993)
(holding that a New York school district violated the First Amendment speech rights of the
Lamb’s Chapel when it prevented it from using a facility to air religious oriented film series
although it allowed other organizations to use the facility to air films that demonstrate a
different viewpoint).
332
There are categories of speech that are not afforded First Amendment protection. See,
e.g., United States v. Hanna, 293 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Supreme
Court has “left no doubt that true threats could be criminalized because they are not protected
speech”) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam)).
333
See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995)
(holding that a policy denying funds to a student publication based on its religious viewpoint
violates the First Amendment); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding
that even where the speech is not protected by the First Amendment and may be prohibited it
must not be selectively prohibited on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint).
334
See Rosenberger, 515 U.S at 829 (“When the government targets not subject matter, but
particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the
more blatant.”); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund., Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
(holding that government may exclude participants for reasonable purposes but may not do so
on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoints or beliefs).
335
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 392 (holding that the state may not endorse one view over
another, even where the opposing is highly disruptive); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412–13
(1989) (holding that a prohibition against burning the American flag is an unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination because it endorses the government’s view at the exclusion of its
opposing view).
336
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414 (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
337
See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381 (holding that even where the speech considered “fighting
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prohibition on viewpoint-based restrictions is not limited to statutes
that name a particular viewpoint. Where a statute does not address a
particular viewpoint but only proponents of a specific view could
reasonably fall under the statute's sweep, the act is considered
viewpoint-based for First Amendment Purposes.338 Invalidation of
statutes because of their disparate impact on holders of specific views
have included, inter alia, statutes regulating leafleting door-todoor,339 requiring street demonstration fees,340 requiring individual
street performer fees,341 and proscribing interfering with a person
lawfully engaged in the act of hunting.342
Where a disparate impact falls on bearers of a specific viewpoint,
the threat to free speech is enormous, and courts must be especially
exacting in their analysis of the legislative judgment behind the
statute.343 By its very terms, AETA only restricts speech that
words,” and is thus not traditionally afforded First Amendment protection and may be
prohibited, it must not be selectively prohibited on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint).
338
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 14 (1986) (plurality
opinion) (holding that an order to include a consumer group’s newsletter in a public utility’s
billing envelope was viewpoint discrimination because it did “not equally constrain both sides
of the debate about utility regulation”); see also Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1500 (11th
Cir. 1996) (noting that if a state adopted initiative that had a disparate impact on certain views it
would be a viewpoint based discrimination); NAACP v. City of Richmond, 743 F.2d 1346,
1356 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Within that framework of facial neutrality, however, we must examine
restrictions on speech with particular care when their effects fall unevenly on different
viewpoints and groups in society.”); Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 235
F. Supp. 2d 1186, 1204 (D. Wyo. 2002) (“The Court would obviously be concerned about Grace
United’s free speech and associational rights if Cheyenne enacted a zoning regulation that:
(1) was content-based; (2) had a disparate impact on certain religious viewpoints; or
(3) although facially neutral, was applied in a discriminatory manner.”), aff’d, 451 F.3d 643
(10th Cir. 2006); Wilson R. Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both
Content-Based and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801,
848 (2004) (noting that laws that have a disparate impact on one viewpoint run the risk of being
viewpoint-based); cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 459 (1980) (overturning a ban on picketing
that contained an exemption for labor picketing because it was viewpoint-based).
339
See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (noting that leafleting is
“essential to the poorly financed causes of little people”).
340
See Forsythe Cnty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (invalidating
demonstration fee requirements because they might give too much discretion to municipalities
in favoring one viewpoint over another).
341
See Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (overturning
solicitation statute that required permits for individual street performers because it allowed city
to approve specific views over others).
342
See Dorman v. Satti, 678 F. Supp. 375, 381 (D. Conn. 1988) (granting plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment and holding that the act that proscribed interfering with hunters
was viewpoint based discrimination), aff’d, 862 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1988) .
343
See Huhn, supra note 338, at 848 (arguing that courts should remain sensitive to
viewpoint-based discrimination even where the statute is facially neutral, but when it has a
disparate impact on holders of a certain view and should scrutinize the connection between the
means selected by the legislature and the end sought).
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interferes with an animal enterprise or person related to an animal
enterprise.344 It only reasonably affects individuals holding the
minority view that the use of animals for certain purposes is
objectionable, but the fact that it is a view endorsed by a minority of
citizens does not remove it from constitutional scrutiny. 345 AETA’s
viewpoint-based restriction on speech is evidenced by the fact that a
person could be subject to terrorist charges for interfering or
attempting or conspiring to interfere with an animal enterprise while
another person in the same location, at the same time, and engaging in
the same conduct but promoting rather than interfering with an animal
enterprise would be free from criminal liability.346 Thus, two
individuals will be treated differently under the law where the only
distinction is the specific viewpoint expressed.
Multiple courts have overturned statutes similar to AETA, namely,
those that prohibit interfering or disrupting a person engaged in
hunting, on the basis that they restrict speech on the basis of the
speaker’s viewpoint.347 Courts have held that such restrictions are
viewpoint-based because it does not extend to all discussions on
hunting but only those motivated by the specific view that hunting is
objectionable.348 Moreover, courts and commentators have taken
special notice of the fact that such laws were advanced by pro-hunting
lobbies in response to the growth in anti-hunting advocacy campaigns
and only individuals morally and philosophically opposed to hunting
were arrested under the statutes.349 Like these invalidated statutes,
344

18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2006).
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (arguing that the repugnant
nature of the conduct and the fact that it is greatly disavowed by most people does not alter the
applicable level of constitutional scrutiny).
346
See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1).
347
See Dorman, 862 F.2d at 437 (invalidating statute that prohibited interfering with
hunters because it was a viewpoint-based discrimination); State v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892, 895
(Conn. 1993) (holding that a statute that prohibited interfering with hunting was an
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discrimination because of its disparate impact on individuals
who morally and philosophically object to hunting); People v. Sanders, 696 N.E.2d 1144, 1150
(Ill. 1998) (Harrison, J., concurring) (noting that statute prohibiting disturbing an individual
engaged in hunting is not only overbroad but also viewpoint-based); State v. Miner, 556 N.W.2d
578, 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that statute prohibiting the disruption of the lawful
taking of wildlife was an unconstitutional viewpoint- and content-based restriction and overly
broad as applied); Opinion of the Justices, 509 A.2d 749, 752 (N.H. 1986) (finding that statute
prohibiting harassment of hunters was viewpoint-based).
348
See, e.g., Dorman, 862 F.2d at 435 (discussing the First Amendment dimensions of
hunting regulations).
349
See, e.g., Sanders, 696 N.E.2d at 1150 (Harrison, J., concurring) (finding that statute
prohibiting disturbing hunters was facially overbroad and noting that all similar laws are
unconstitutional viewpoint-based discriminations proliferated by groups aimed at reducing
activism as evidenced by the fact that their development directly corresponds with successful
345
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AETA’s reach does not extend to all expressive conduct relating to
the subject of animal enterprises, but only to that which expresses a
specific ideology.350 Like statutes aimed at prohibiting interference
with hunting, AETA and its predecessor statute were drafted in
response to the increased campaigns of animal rights activists and
were promoted by lobbyists aimed at suppressing those views.351
Even if AETA’s reach extends to no more than “true threats,” it is
an unconstitutional viewpoint-based restriction. Whether a restriction
is viewpoint-based is not a question of what speech is regulated but
how the government has chosen to regulate it.352 In R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, individuals were arrested under a statute that prohibited acts
aimed at inciting “anger, alarm or resentment . . . on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender” after they burned a cross in an
African-American family’s yard.353 The Supreme Court held even
after accepting the Minnesota Supreme Court’s construction of the
statute as only reaching conduct that amounted to “fighting words,”
which are outside of First Amendment protection, that the statute was
facially invalid.354 The court explained that defamation, obscenity,
“fighting words,” “true threats,” and other speech may be limited by
statute without offending the First Amendment.355
[However,] they are [not] categories of speech entirely
invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the
vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their
activism campaigns and additionally noting that this viewpoint-based discrimination was
emphasized by the fact that only individuals holding the view that hunting is morally
objectionable have been arrested under the acts); Katherine Hessler, Where Do We Draw the
Line Between Harassment and Free Speech?: An Analysis of Hunter Harassment Law, 3
ANIMAL L. 129, 161 n.21 (1997) (noting that hunter harassment laws were promoted by the
Sportsman’s Caucus and the Wildlife Legislation Fund of America, which are pro-hunting lobby
groups).
350
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The principle inquiry in
determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys.”).
351
See Public Policy, supra note 31, at 7 (“NABR led the initiative to pass the Animal
Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, making it a federal offense to destroy research. This was the
first of several NABR-endorsed pieces of legislation designed to protect research facilities and
individuals targeted by animal rights groups.”). On its website the NABR credits AETA’s
passing to the pressure it placed on Washington and warns that without this law animal rights
activists would be much more effective in pushing for alternative sources of testing. Id.
352
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992).
353
Id. at 380 (quotations omitted) (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGISLATIVE CODE § 292.02
(1990)).
354
Id. at 381.
355
Id.
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distinctly proscribable content. Thus, the government may
proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content
discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the
government.356
The fact that expressive conduct can be proscribed for one reason
does not entail that it can be proscribed for another.357 The R.A.V.
Court overturned the statute on the basis that while the legislature was
permitted to prohibit “fighting words,” it may not do so only against
speakers who express a specific view.358 Under the Minnesota statute,
a person who uses “fighting words” in opposition to specific races,
colors, creeds, religions, or gender roles has violated the law while a
person who uses “fighting words” to counter those views has not.359
The legislature has no “authority to license one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules.”360
It is within the purview of the legislature to prohibit “true threats,”
but it may not prohibit only “true threats” that endorse a particular
view.361 Even where AETA is interpreted to reach only “true threats,”
the law is viewpoint-based because it proscribes only “true threats”
that interfere with an animal enterprise, which is another way of
saying that it prohibits “true threats” made in support of the animal
rights view that animals should not be used for commercial,
entertainment, and research purposes.362 AETA’s reach does not
extend to “true threats” made by supporters of the contrary view,
however. Thus, the government has demanded that one side of the
debate abide by more stringent rules than the other.

356

Id. at 383–84.
See id. at 386 (noting that simply because speech can be proscribed on the basis of
noise control does not mean that it can be prohibited on the basis of obscenity).
358
Id. at 390–91.
359
See id. The court uses the example of an individual who under the statute would be able
to hold up a sign stating that “‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are misbegotten” while another individual
would commit a criminal act by stating that all “‘papists’ are [misbegotten].” Id. at 391–92.
360
Id. at 392.
361
See id. at 390–91 (noting that the city may prohibit “fighting words” generally, but not
where it singles out “fighting words” spoken by a specific group who opposed non-whites).
362
See REGAN, supra note 9, at 330–98 (discussing that the principles of animal rights are
the dissolution of the use of animals in research, animal products in food and materials, and
sport hunting and trapping).
357
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ii. AETA Restricts Speech on the Basis of Content
Content-based restrictions are those that restrict speech beyond
mere time, place, or manner but do not restrict a specific viewpoint.363
Content-based restrictions on speech are inherently dangerous
because they “raise[] the specter that the government may effectively
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”364 The
Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he government's purpose is the
controlling consideration” in whether a law is content-based or
content-neutral.365 Where a statute prohibits conduct that contains
both speech and non-speech elements, and where the restriction on
speech is more than merely incidental to the restriction on conduct,
the courts consider the restriction content-based for First Amendment
purposes.366
AETA penalizes interfering or attempting or conspiring to
interfere with an animal enterprise.367 The term interfere includes a
substantial amount of expressive conduct.368 In invalidating a statute
that prohibited interfering “with the lawful taking of wildlife by
another person,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that the statutory term “interfere” could not be
justified as a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.369 Courts
interpreting similar language in similar contexts have ruled
accordingly.370 Because “interfer[ence]” has a significant speech
363
See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 388–91
(1993) (discussing the distinction between viewpoint- and content-based restrictions on speech).
364
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991) (holding that a law aimed at compensating victims by placing all profits that a
criminal makes from any book that discusses the crime was invalid because although it
expressed a legitimate state interest in compensating victims and preventing criminals from
profiting from their crimes, it was sufficiently overinclusive in that it targeted all money related
to any book that expresses any thoughts on the crime, even those that are only tangentially or
incidentally related).
365
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
366
See United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen the definition
of a crime or tort embraces any conduct that causes or might cause a certain harm, and the law is
applied to speech whose communicative impact causes the relevant harm, we treat the law as
content-based.” (citing Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988))) The court applied this
reasoning to conclude that a statute that interfered with a land sale was content based. Id.
367
18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2006).
368
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.a.i.
369
Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 433, 437 (2d. Cir. 1988) (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-183a).
370
See State v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892, 895 (Conn. 1993) (because it is the communicative
aspect of the conduct that is being prohibited, it must be viewed as a content-based restriction);
State v. Casey, 876 P.2d 138, 140 (Idaho 1994) (rejecting appellant’s argument that a statute
that made it a misdemeanor to enter or remain in an area with the intent to interfere with the
lawful taking or pursuit of wildlife was unconstitutionally content-based); State v. Sanders, 696
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component and it is the communicative aspect of the speech that
causes the specific harm, this restriction must be viewed as contentbased.371
Content-based restrictions are evaluated under the public forum
doctrine.372 Whether content-based restrictions are constitutional is
often a question of where the speech is being restricted.373 Traditional
public forums are locations that “have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used
for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions.”374 They include places such as:
streets, parks, sidewalks, areas around state capitals, and town
halls.375 The government may only restrict the content of speech in
traditional public forums where the restriction supports a compelling
governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to meet that end.376
Protecting the safety of citizens and their property is one of the
most basic and essential Police Powers, and it naturally follows that
ensuring the safety of individuals associated with animal enterprises
is a compelling governmental interest.377 This is not the interest
N.E.2d 1144 (Ill. 1998) (holding that a statute prohibiting the disturbing of another engaged in
the lawful taking of a wildlife animal with the intent to dissuade was an impermissible contentbased restriction on speech and violated the First Amendment); Opinion of the Justices, 509
A.2d 749 (N.H. 1986) (statute that prohibited the harassment of hunters, fishers, and trappers
was constitutionally objectionable in that it was content-based and swept too broadly); State v.
Miner, 556 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a statute prohibiting the disruption
of the lawful taking of wildlife was an unconstitutional content-based restriction).
371
See Cassel, 408 F.3d at 626 (holding that a statute prohibiting interfering with a federal
land sale is content-based because it is the communicative aspect of the conduct that causes the
harm).
372
See David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143, 160–
203 (1992) (arguing that the public forum doctrine’s emphasis on formalism actually has the
effect of restricting speech, but is consistently what the Supreme Court applies).
373
See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1224
(1984) (arguing that the formalistic nature of the public forum doctrine disrupts the contentbased analysis, which should be central).
374
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (quoting
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring)).
375
See id. (streets and parks are public forums and not all speech may be prohibited within
a public forum); see also Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761
(1995) (holding that mall surrounding Ohio’s State Capital building is a traditional public
forum); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (concluding that plaza surrounding city hall
is a traditional public forum); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(ruling that a sidewalk is a traditional public forum); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177
(1983) (holding that sidewalks are traditional public forums).e
376
Farber & Nowak, supra note 373, at 1220 (discussing the constitutionality of
regulations covering classic public forums).
377
See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (noting that it is a traditional
exercise of the police powers to protect the safety of citizens).
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articulated by the statute, however. AETA’s stated interest is to
protect against interferences that cause lost revenue to animal
enterprises.378 This is a substantially broader concept, and whether
restricting interference with the profits or good will of a broad class
of business enterprises is a compelling governmental interest is a
different question altogether.379 Assuming arguendo that the interest
at stake is the prevention of harm to employees and damage to
facilities, the identified interest does not appropriately fit the means
selected to serve that interest. 380 Even where such a content-based
restriction serves a compelling governmental interest, it must be
narrowly tailored so that it does not excessively restrict speech.381
AETA proscribes interferences regardless of where, when, or how
they occur, within traditional public forums or otherwise.382 The
statute goes so far as to proscribe conduct that does not interfere with
an animal enterprise but where the actor has conspired or attempted to
do so.383 These activities are prohibited irrespective of where they
occur, whether in a traditional public forum or otherwise.384 Blocking
such a broad category of speech without exception to where it occurs
runs afoul of the First Amendment.385

378

See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1), (c) (2006).
In similar contexts, courts have determined that preventing interference from hunting,
which is logically related to animal enterprises because they both involve the killing of animals
for food and clothing, is not a compelling governmental interest. See Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d
432, 437 (2d Cir. 1988) (“There is no showing that protecting hunters from harassment
constitutes a compelling state interest.”); cf. State v. Miner, 556 N.W.2d 578, 583 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (assuming arguendo that hunting was a compelling state interest, the court
nonetheless found that prohibiting only expressive conduct that interfered with hunting was not
necessary to protect that interest).
380
See Farber & Nowak, supra note 373, at 1240 (discussing the role of consistency
between the government’s goal and First Amendment values).
381
Id. at 1220.
382
See Day, supra note 372, at 180–90 (noting that despite the doctrine’s flaws, the
Supreme Court has consistently used the public forum doctrine in evaluating content-based
restrictions).
383
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(C).
384
See id. § (a)(2)(A)–(C) (the statute does not provide any limitations with respect to
where violations must occur).
385
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (holding that although the
prevention of hate crimes is a compelling governmental interest, the Minnesota hate crime
prevention statute violates the First Amendment because there are content-neutral alternatives,
including physical assault laws).
379

1/11/2011 2:28:20 PM

2011]
6161

UNITED STATES V. FULLMER

iii. AETA Prohibits Expressive Conduct Without Limitation to
Time, Place, and Manner
Expressive conduct may be subject to “reasonable time, place, or
manner restrictions . . . provided that they are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that
they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information.”386 “A statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and
eliminates no more than the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to
remedy.”387 The Supreme Court has further stated that although the
regulation must be narrowly tailored, it need not be the least intrusive
means possible.388
In Hill v. Colorado, the Supreme Court upheld a statute
prohibiting persons from knowingly approaching within eight feet of
a person who is within 100 feet of a healthcare facility entrance for
the purpose of displaying a sign, engaging in oral protest, education,
counseling, or passing leaflets or handbills unless the individual
consents to that approach.389 The Court upheld the statute because it
was content-neutral in that it prohibited all communications
regardless of their content or the viewpoint they expressed, and was
thus content neutral.390 Further, the statute was limited to a specific
time, place, and manner restriction: an eight-foot floating buffer
zone.391 It provided ample alternative channels of communication
because it placed no restrictions on speech that occurred outside of
the floating buffer zone, and it only applied to unwanted physical
approach.392 In the event that the passerby consented to the approach,
the statute placed no restrictions on the speaker.393
AETA lacks each of the safeguards provided by the Hill statute.
AETA proscribes interference without limitation to time, place, or
manner and does not contain a consent provision or otherwise make

386

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989) (“Lest any confusion on
the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected
speech must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests
but that it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.”).
389
Id. at 730.
390
Id. at 723.
391
Id. at 729–30.
392
Id. at 729 (“Signs, pictures, and voice itself can cross an 8-foot gap with ease.”).
393
Id. at 723.
387
388
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available alternative channels of communication.394 The only
requirement is that a person interferes with an animal enterprise or
attempts or conspires to do so.395 Thus, unlike an eight-foot barrier
that limits but does not prohibit communications, AETA can be used
as an outright ban. It does not address time, place, or manner in any
respect; it simply prohibits interfering or attempting or conspiring to
do so with a broadly defined set of business interests.396 Had the Hill
statute prohibited all expressive conduct that interfered with abortions
regardless of time, speech, or manner, the Court would not have
upheld the statute.397 Courts following Hill have overturned statutes
that have attempted to extend this buffer zone beyond eight feet
because it diminishes alternative channels of communication.398
AETA’s lack of time, place, or manner restrictions and its
potential impact on expressive conduct is evidenced by the recent
arrests in United States v. Buddenberg. In Buddenberg, four
individuals were arrested for conspiracy to violate AETA after
leaving a stack of leaflets that personally identified researchers,
focused picketing outside of a researcher’s private residences, and
chalking messages on a public sidewalk.399 These arrests provide a
glimpse into the extent of AETA’s reach in the absence of time,
place, and manner restrictions.
Similarly, in Frisby v. Schultz,400 the Court upheld an ordinance
that prohibited “focused picketing” outside of a private residence. 401
Although the government may restrict the use of streets and sidewalks
through appropriate regulation, “that right remains unfettered unless
and until the government passes such regulations.”402 Frisby supports
only the narrow proposition that the right to residential privacy may
394

See 18 U.S.C. § 43 (2006).
Id. § 43(a)(2).
396
Id.
397
See Hill, 530 U.S. at 723 (noting that the statute does not violate the First Amendment
where it does not ban the communications themselves but merely regulates where they can
occur).
398
See New York v. Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding
that an expansion of the buffer zone to fifteen feet was unconstitutional).
399
United States v. Buddenberg, No. CR-09-00263 RMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100477,
at *1–5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009). For a description of the events that occurred over a several
month period, as well as the attempted entry into a home that was charged separately, see supra
text accompanying note 322.
400
487 U.S. 474 (1988).
401
See id. at 483.
402
Dean v. Byerley, 354 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that there is a
constitutional right to focused picketing in the absence of a narrowly tailored time, place, and
manner restriction).
395
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be a significant governmental interest that can be served through a
narrowly tailored time, place, and manner restriction, and not the
broader proposition that residential privacy inevitably trumps the
right to focused picketing in residential areas.403 In the absence of a
narrowly tailored statute, the right to focused picketing remains
unfettered.404 The Supreme Court has also upheld regulations that
restrict leafleting to designated areas,405 but the Court has flatly
rejected broader attempts at prohibiting leafleting as mere time, place,
and manner restrictions.406 Because AETA fails to define time, place,
and manner restrictions, it can be used to abrogate these principles. In
Buddenberg, there were not narrowly tailored restrictions on focused
picketing or distributing leaflets as the Constitution demands.407
Rather the court used AETA’s broad provision, which proscribes
conspiring or attempting to interfere with an animal enterprise, to
prohibit these activities.408
AETA’s broad definition of “animal enterprise” engulfs far more
than the evil that it seeks to remedy and does not make available
alternative channels of communication.409 This definition includes
businesses with even a tangential relationship to animals: almost all
403
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486–88 (noting that residential privacy may serve to fulfill one
of the requirements that the statute serve a significant government interest, but the Court does
not hold or state in dicta that residential areas are not part of the public forum or outside of First
Amendment protection). This is the way that courts have interpreted Frisby. See, e.g., Dean, 354
F.3d at 551 (“[W]e conclude that the First Amendment protects the right to engage in peaceful
targeted residential picketing in the absence of a narrowly tailored time, place, or manner
regulation that meets the requirements laid down in Frisby.”).
404
See Dean, 354 F.3d at 551 (relying on Frisby for the proposition that the government
may only prohibit targeted picketing if it has articulated a legitimate governmental interest and
drafted a narrowly tailored statute to fulfill that interest, but in the absence of such a statute the
right to targeted picketing remains absolute).
405
See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(upholding a restriction on leafleting to a specified booth at a state fair).
406
See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943) (holding that a ban on
leafleting door-to-door was not a time, place, or manner restriction, but was a viewpoint based
restriction because this type of communication is “essential to the poorly financed causes of
little people”).
407
See Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486–88 (noting that focused picketing may be restricted under a
well-tailored statute); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654–55 (noting that leafleting may be restricted to
certain areas only under a well-tailored statute).
408
See United States v. Buddenberg, No. CR-09-00263 RMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100477, at *2–5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009) (noting that the choice to charge the defendants under
18 U.S.C. § 371 rather than 18 U.S.C § 43(a)(2)(C) was inconsequential).
409
See 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(1) (2006) (defining an animal enterprise as “(A) a commercial or
academic enterprise that uses or sells animals or animal products for profit, food or fiber
production, agriculture, education, research, or testing; (B) a zoo, aquarium, animal shelter, pet
store, breeder, furrier, circus, or rodeo, or other lawful competitive animal event; or (C) any fair
or similar event intended to advance agricultural arts or sciences”).
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retail stores that make or sell clothing as well as grocery stores,
restaurants, automobile manufacturers, automobile dealers, gas
stations that sell food, schools, universities, and countless other
commercial enterprises that in some way use or sell animal
products.410 AETA’s reach extends beyond these entities, however,
because it also ensnares individuals related to animal enterprises, as
well as their family members.411 It is difficult to imagine that a statute
that placed such broad restrictions on other morally and politically
based conduct would be upheld.412
Further militating against the proposition that AETA makes
available ample alternative channels of communication is the fact
that, unlike the Hill statute, AETA does not make exception for
instances in which the audience consents to the interference.413 If a
person interferes with an animal enterprise, even where the audience
consents to the interference, the individual has violated AETA.414 An
individual could potentially violate AETA for protesting a store
causing it to lose greater than $10,000 in revenue or customer good
will.415 Moreover, a person violates AETA when they merely attempt
or conspire to interfere with one of these entities but no actual
interference occurs.416
Statutes that penalize interferences without limitation to specific
times, places, and manners violate the overbreadth doctrine.417 Under
410

See id.
See id. § 43(a)(2).
412
It is difficult to imagine that a statute aimed at halting the actions of anti-abortionists
could be framed so broadly and survive constitutional scrutiny. A statute that sought to prohibit
interfering with health care enterprises, for example, and then defined a health care enterprise as
any entity even incidentally related to the use or sale of health care products could not survive
constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000) (permitting an
eight-foot zone in which no speech could be had because it was obvious that speech made
outside of this zone was clearly heard and expressive conduct was clearly seen, and the Court
indicated that had the zone been larger it would not have been upheld); New York v. Operation
Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d 184, 190 (2001) (holding that an expansion of the buffer zone to fifteen
feet violated the First Amendment).
413
See 18 U.S.C. § 43.
414
See id.
415
There are real worries about whether such a prosecution will occur. See Prince & Heinz,
supra note 291.
416
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(C).
417
See Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 1988), (“[T]he Act reaches a wide
range of activities confined to no particular time, place or manner.”), aff’d, 862 F.2d 432 (2d
Cir. 1988); State v. Casey, 876 P.2d 138, 141 (Idaho 1994) (holding that a statute prohibiting
intentionally interfering with hunting was unconstitutionally overbroad as it was not a
sufficiently limited time, place, or manner restriction); State v. Miner, 556 N.W.2d 578, 586
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that a statute prohibiting disruption of the lawful taking of
wildlife was unconstitutionally overbroad because it was not a specific time, place, or manner
restriction).
411
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this doctrine, courts strike down laws that limit expressive conduct in
such an all-encompassing manner, even when the specific conduct
could be limited through more narrowly tailored time, place, and
manner restrictions.418 The fact that the statute does not preclude
every alternative method of communication does not mean that it has
allowed ample alternative methods of communication.419 If the evil
the government seeks to prevent is physical harm to researchers or
research facilities or the releasing of animals from farms, it has
chosen an exceedingly broad statute to serve this purpose. AETA
prohibits interfering or attempting or conspiring to interfere without
exception.420 Courts have held that where an act proscribes
interference but fails “to limit the proscribed interference as to time
and place, [it] carries its effect far beyond the proper scope of
government regulation.”421 Other courts have concluded that the term
“interfere” is incapable of being limited to a time, place, and manner
restriction and it is, therefore, necessarily overbroad.422 Either way,
AETA impedes upon a substantial amount of protected speech, and
because its constitutional infirmity is incapable of being saved by a
narrowing construction, it violates the First Amendment overbreadth
doctrine.
2. AETA Is Unconstitutionally Vague
AETA is unconstitutionally vague for the same reasons that it is
overbroad, namely, its reliance on expansive terms and failure to limit
the scope of those terms by reference to a limiting definition.
Moreover, because AETA implicates the First Amendment, the court
should read the vagueness concerns in combination with the free
speech concerns.423 AETA’s imprecise and inconsistent use of
418
See Klein v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that
an anti-litter law that prohibited the distribution of leaflets onto unoccupied cars violated
leafleters’ First Amendment rights as it was not narrowly tailored to meet the government’s
interest).
419
Id. (noting that by eliminating the broad class of communications it was not narrowly
tailored even though there were other ways of communicating, including phone, word of mouth,
and leafleting to individuals on the street or in their automobiles).
420
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2).
421
Dorman, 678 F. Supp. at 382 (granting plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and
holding that the Hunter Harassment Act was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad).
422
See State v. Ball, 627 A.2d 892, 895 (Conn. 1993) (holding that interference is
inescapably imbued with speech and expression and cannot be limited by judicial construction).
423
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (overturning a Virginia statute
prohibiting solicitation of legal services because of its potential to extend into the civil rights
movement and noting that where a statute presents both vagueness and overbreadth concerns the
potential for constitutional infirmity is great and the statute may be overturned in circumstances
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language results in individuals having to guess at what conduct it
prohibits. It also obliges those law enforcement officials charged with
the responsibility of enforcing AETA to make key policy
determinations about its very meaning on an ad hoc and subjective
basis. Because of these infirmities, citizens must necessarily steer far
wider of AETA’s reach than if its boundaries were clearly identified.
A criminal statute can be held unconstitutionally vague for either
of two reasons: (1) it fails to provide sufficient notice to enable
people of ordinary intelligence to conform their conduct to the
prohibitions of the statute; or (2) it authorizes or encourages arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.424 The first test is met where a
statute’s imprecise language prevents notice of what conduct is
prohibited such that “men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning.”425 The notice requirement is essential to due
process.426 It is intended to prevent unfair prosecutions where the
defendant conformed his behavior to one competing interpretation of
a statute while the prosecution has adopted another interpretation,
thereby preventing the individual from properly conforming his
conduct to the requirements of the law.427 “No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal
statutes.”428 Where a statute’s language is imprecise there are two
foreseeable results: (1) the individual who attempts to conform his
conduct to the confines of the law risks criminal sanction because of
the statute’s imprecise language, and (2) “[u]ncertain meanings
inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’ . . .
than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.”429
a. AETA Supports Multiple Reasonable Interpretations
AETA’s failure to define key terms renders it unconstitutionally
vague.430 Its repeated and inconsistent use of expansive terms that are
it would not if only a claim of vagueness or overbreadth was made).
424
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (opinion of Stevens, J.).
425
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
426
Morales, 527 U.S. at 58 (”[T]he purpose of the fair notice requirement is to enable the
ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law.”).
427
Connally, 269 U.S. at 393.
428
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
429
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (omission in original) (quoting
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964)).
430
See Andrew N. Ireland Moore, Comment, Caging Animal Advocates’ Political
Freedoms: The Unconstitutionality of the Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act, 11 ANIMAL L.
255, 273 (2004) (arguing that the ambiguous language chosen is void for vagueness because it
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not defined by statute creates an ambiguity not only about whether the
incriminating fact has been proven in a particular circumstance, but
also what conduct AETA prohibits.431 The Supreme Court has
consistently overturned statutes on vagueness grounds where the plain
meaning of the language carries multiple interpretations.432 Whether
some activity interferes with an animal enterprise is a subjective
judgment unguided by a meaningful statutory definition, narrowing
context, or settled legal meaning.433 This ambiguity is increased by
AETA’s criminalizing of attempt or conspiracy to interfere with an
animal enterprise.434 AETA opponents have long criticized its reliance
on the use of the term “interfere” because of its propensity to be
interpreted in broad and conflicting ways. These concerns are also
reflected in its legislative history.435 Recognizing this lack of
interpretive guidance, other courts have stuck down statutes that rely
on the term “interfere” and similar terms because of their inherent
ambiguity.436
AETA’s reliance on imprecise language causes individuals seeking
to engage in advocacy to find themselves at a loss as to what conduct
is prohibited.437 The potential for multiple interpretations is evident in
the pending prosecutions in Buddenberg.438 Regardless of whether
fails to provide adequate notice of what acts are prohibited).
431
See United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1841 (2008) (noting that what renders a
statute vague is not the inability to determine close calls or boundary cases but a lack or notice
of what the prohibited fact is).
432
See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (overturning an ordinance
that prohibited remaining in the same place with no apparent purpose after a dispersal warning
had been given because there were multiple interpretations of what was an apparent purpose as
well as what it meant to disperse); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)
(overturning a statute prohibiting three or more people in a group acting in a manner that annoys
passersby because what annoys one person may not annoy another).
433
See Dorman v. Satti, 862 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that “interfere” is vague
and overbroad and overturning a statute that failed to include a limiting definition).
434
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(C) (2006).
435
See Kucinich Statement, supra note 246 (“[AETA] paint[s] everyone with the broad
brush of terrorism who might have a legitimate objection to a type of research or treatment of
animals that is not humane. . . . This bill is written in such a way as to have a chilling effect on
the exercise of peoples’ first amendment rights.”); Potter Statement, supra note 246, at 23
(“[AETA] will force Americans to decide if speaking up for animals is worth the risk of being
labeled a ‘terrorist,’ either in the media or in the courtroom. That’s not a choice anyone should
have to make.”).
436
See, e.g., Dorman, 862 F.2d at 437 (holding that “interfere” is impermissibly vague and
does not provide fair notice of what conduct is prohibited).
437
See generally Severson, supra note 291; Prince & Heinz, supra note 291; Erickson,
supra note 291.
438
See Unites States v. Buddenberg, No. CR-09-00263 RMW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
100477, at *19–23 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2009) (listing a number of different court interpretations
of “interfere,” “interrupt,” and other such language).
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focused picketing, chalking public sidewalks, and disseminating
leaflets that personally identify researchers are the proper subject of
criminal laws, there are concerns about whether AETA provides
warning that these or similar activities are within its reach.439 AETA’s
legislative history reveals that its intended aim is to prevent
clandestine or otherwise untraceable offenses; yet, the arrests in
Buddenberg involve conduct that is often adequately controlled by
local ordinances.440 Because of the inconsistency between AETA’s
stated aim and its recent application and its use of expansive terms
that encompass a considerable amount of conduct, activists are left to
guess how it will be applied in future circumstances.441
A clear example of this type of confusion is in the area of
whistleblowing. AETA’s failure to define “real or personal property”
means that under well settled judicial decisions it includes good will
and reduced profits.442 Under the plain language of the statute, an
individual who videotapes or even attempts to videotape the inside of
an animal enterprise for the purpose of disclosing the information to
the public violates its provisions.443 When an undercover activist
gained access to a slaughterhouse in 2008 and videotaped footage of
cows so sick that they could not stand, footage which led to the recall
of 143 million pounds of meat, the largest in American history, there
were concerns over whether the activist would be prosecuted. Some
suggested that had the activist not been tied to the Human Society of
the United States he might have been prosecuted.444 Whether or not
such actions are of the type that are likely to be prosecuted is unclear,
but the fact that it is unclear forces individuals to steer far wider than
they would if the boundaries of the law were clearly marked. For a
statute to require such accommodations violates the Constitution.445

439

See text accompanying supra note 339; see also supra notes 407–29 and accompanying

text.
440
Cf. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486–88 (1988) (holding that a local ordinance
banning all picketing, if narrowly tailored to the household rather than the public, is
constitutional).
441
Severson, supra note 291, at F3.
442
See discussion at supra Part III.A.1.a.ii.
443
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2) (2006).
444
See, e.g., Severson, supra note 291, at F3 (questioning whether the tremendous
economic damages caused by the recall would lead to prosecution and suggesting that had the
activist been tied to PETA or another animal rights organization more controversial than the
Humane Society prosecutions would have been more likely).
445
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972).
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b. AETA Lacks Explicit Standards for
Those Who Have to Enforce It
AETA’s failure to define key terms and provide explicit standards
for those whose role it is to enforce its provisions renders it void for
vagueness. Laws inherently delegate some interpretive authority to
those charged with enforcing them, but a law that “delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application” is impermissibly vague.446 In City of
Houston v. Hill,447 the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that made
it “unlawful for any person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose,
molest, abuse or interrupt any policemen in the execution of his duty,
or any person summoned to aid in making an arrest.”448 At issue was
the prohibition of “in any manner . . . interrupt[ing] any policeman in
the execution of his duty,”449 which the Court invalidated because it
granted authority to police officers to select which activities were an
interruption.450 Like interrupting, whether some conduct is interfering
or not is a subjective judgment, but the Supreme Court has been
resistant to allowing enforcement of statutes where the prohibited fact
is capable of such malleability.451 These concerns are especially
apparent in AETA’s conspiracy and attempt provision where the only
requirement is that the offender attempt or conspire to interfere.452
Enforcers have been delegated the impermissible authority to write
the law as they go. This discretion offends the Constitution’s fair
notice requirement.453 An “ordinance is unconstitutional, not because
a policemen applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a particular
446
Id. at 108–09; see also Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402–03 (1966) (“[A] law
fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and jurors free to
decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular
case.”); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S 611, 616 (1971) (invalidating a regulation that
prohibited individuals from “annoying” passersby because it unconstitutionally delegated
interpretive authority to those whose job it was to enforce it).
447
482 U.S. 451 (1987).
448
Id. at 455 (quoting HOUS. TEX. CODE ORDINANCES § 34–11(a) (1984)).
449
Id. at 461.
450
Id. (noting that regardless of how many qualifying offenses actually occurred, police
were granted unguided discretion to select those that were prosecutable).
451
See Coates, 402 U.S. at 614 (overturning a statute that prohibited three or more
individuals from annoying passersby because what is annoying to one person may not be
annoying to others).
452
18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(C) (2006).
453
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (holding that a law is
unconstitutionally vague when it “authorize[s] . . . arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement”).
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case, but rather because the policemen enjoys too much discretion in
every case.”454
Discretion to enforce on an ad hoc basis is always viewed with
suspicion, but it is especially troublesome when those individuals
likely to be impacted by the interpretation are ones whose “ideas, . . .
lifestyle, or . . . physical appearance is resented by the majority of
their fellow citizens.”455 The Supreme Court has stated that courts
should be especially suspicious of laws whose likely targets are
individuals critical of those who enforce the law456 or a politically
marginal group457 because “a statute broadly curtailing group activity
. . . may easily become a weapon of oppression, however evenhanded
its terms appear.”458 In such an instance, the mere existence of the
statute may freeze out all activity that encroaches upon the statute’s
approximate reach.459 Animal rights activists, who are individuals that
advocate for a moral and political position endorsed by only a small
minority of the population and which directly challenges many of
society’s laws and beliefs, are undoubtedly such a group. The
uncertainty caused by AETA’s imprecise language will drastically
curtail debate and animal rights advocacy.460
CONCLUSION
“[D]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and . . . it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks . . . .”461 The Third Circuit’s
reliance on historical context to draw traditionally protected speech
454

Id. at 71 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Coates, 402 U.S. at 616.
456
See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 (1991) (noting that history
indicates that speech is most likely to be “suppressed when either the speaker or the message is
critical of those who enforce the law,” and this effect is exacerbated when the law is written
broadly enough to allow for discriminatory enforcement).
457
See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 434–37 (1963) (overturning a broadly worded
statute that prohibited solicitation of the legal profession, even though on its face it applied to all
equally, because of its likely application to African-Americans).
458
Id. at 435–36.
459
Id. at 436 (noting that a broadly worded Virginia statute had the potential to end all
activity on behalf of the civil rights movement altogether because of its potential to be enforced
in a discriminatory manner, even if no prosecutions ever occurred).
460
Despite increased acceptance in recent years, the animal rights movement remains a
minority movement. Because of its beliefs and actions taken in furtherance of these moral and
political beliefs, the animal rights movement is often detested by champions of industry. See
discussion supra Part I.
461
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
455
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from First Amendment protection in United States v. Fullmer places
this ideal at risk. AETA’s prohibition against interfering or attempting
or conspiring to interfere without reference to a fixed statutory
meaning or other narrowing context further endangers this principle.
Even if criminal charges are unlikely to be brought in a specific
context, AETA’s vagueness creates the appearance of criminality, and
the mere prospect of prosecution has the potential to silence debate on
a wide range of important issues.
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